PB 34-91-4
OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1991

Military Intelligence



DESERT STORM: The MI Experience

Military Intelligence

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VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

We have just celebrated the 29th anniversary of the establishment of the Military Intelligence Branch and the 4th anniversary of the founding of our Corps. We celebrated these anniversaries 12 July at the home of MI with a ceremony in which we inducted seven new members into our MI Hall of Fame. They were: Colonel (Ret.) Jack Pattison, Colonel (Ret.) Duwayne Lundgren, Colonel John Aiso (posthumously), Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Nicholson, Jr. (posthumously), Chief Warrant Officer (Ret.) Robert Leigh, Mr. Herbert Hovey, Jr., and Mr. Paul Shoemaker.

At the same ceremony, we dedicated five key Intelligence Center facilities to deceased members of our Hall of Fame, including the Command Lab in Riley Barracks to Colonel Leland J. Holland; the All-Source Training Facility to Colonel James N. Rowe; the auditorium in Alvarado Hall to Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch; the Joint STARS Training Facility to Brigadier General George W. Goddard; and the Strategic Debriefing Building to Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir.

The MI Corps Hall of Fame was instituted in 1987, the year our Corps was activated. With the new inductees, the Hall of Fame now has 119 members. It honors MI professionals who have made significant contributions to the Army and to MI. Members can be military or civilian, living or deceased. The next selection board will meet in February 1992. If you'd like to nominate someone, you may do so by calling Captain Kelly Crosby at AV 821-1180 or commercial (602) 533-1180.

The Hall of Fame ceremony was followed by a luncheon in honor of our inductees. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Tom Weinstein, the distinguished colonel of the MI Corps, was the guest speaker. Later that evening, we celebrated with our MI Ball, at which Lieutenant General (Ret.) Chuck Eichelberger was the guest of honor and speaker. His speech at the MI Ball is reproduced in this issue, and I encourage you to read it. It's a *tour de force* of our branch, written by an officer who has served MI and our Army superbly for over 35 years. Lieutenant General Eichelberger retired on September 30 after serving as the DCSINT of the Army and as the Army's senior intelligence officer for the last 2 years.

Lieutenant General Eichelberger's speech covers the future of our branch well and, I believe, very accurately, describing it as "better than ever." Our branch has matured significantly over the past 29 years. We're clearly better than we've ever been, and most members of other branches and senior Army leadership look upon us as equal partners—key members of the combined arms team and pivotal contributors on the battlefield.

Despite this reputation and the significant progress we've made over the past 29 years, there are still those who believe we don't have enough MI officers sufficiently imbued with the war-fighter spirit. A few doubt we have sufficient numbers who truly understand the intelligence requirements of tactical and operational level combat arms commanders. Collectively, we have a challenge to prove our critics wrong; not with words, but deeds, if we're to realize the full potential of our future.

Clearly, we are crucial to any fight in which our Army may engage and to the proper preparation of our Army to face potential adversaries around the globe. Many of you have heard me say that we in MI are the key to victory on any battlefield, and I firmly believe that. We are the key to enabling commanders to focus and leverage their combat power, so they can fight smart and win while minimizing friendly casualties. You need to believe this too, and, together, we need to convince those who may doubt us that **this is a fact**, not just rhetoric.

There are several things we can do to demonstrate our resolve and our ability to support combat commanders properly. First, we can fill key intelligence positions in their organizations with tactically and technically qualified officers with the authorized rank: For example, MI captains filling maneuver battalion S2 positions, and MI majors filling maneuver brigade S2 slots. Our "must fill" assignment policy, approved by the DCSPER, DA, will allow us to do this consistently.

Second, we can train our officers better so they don't just provide their commanders with a continuous stream of intelligence information; rather, they will synthesize that data, answering the "so what" questions to provide their commanders the decisive intelligence they need to have, when they

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Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

It's good to get feedback on the quality of soldier the Intelligence Center trains. Continue to give us your feedback. We need to know what we're doing right, what we're doing wrong, and how you think we can do it better.

Ground breaking has started on the new NCO Academy here at Fort Huachuca, Home of Military Intelligence. This is a dream come true for our Corps. The academy complex will consist of classroom and billeting space. What a relief to know that we're moving toward evacuating the World War II buildings. Our new academy will give us the space we need to move the BNCOC here from Fort Devens. Once the move is completed, our NCO basic and advanced courses, at last, will be in one location. The time frame for completion is late 1994 or early 1995.

During my visits to the field the one question NCOs ask most often is, "How can I increase my chances for promotion?" I'll try to give you a little insight which may help you prepare for the next DA selection board.

As we all know there's no magic secret to a selection board. They don't throw darts at a set of records. The selection board applies the whole soldier concept and selects the best qualified.

I'll start with the photo: It plays a big role in the selection process. Your photo represents you to the board. So, it's important that the photo shows you in a good light. Make sure you're wearing a well-fitted uniform and all your awards and decorations are displayed properly. If you look overweight it's likely there will be an inquiry to your commander. It's important that mustaches and haircuts are within regulation. Anything that's out of order on the uniform will stand out in the photo. Check and double check that photo.

It goes without saying that a college education isn't required for promotion. However, some college is a plus. If you have done nothing to increase your civilian education you aren't going to be as competitive as someone who has some college. Visit your education center and they will help you evaluate your military schooling and convert that training to college credits.

The NCO-ER tells the board what jobs you have held and how well you performed in those jobs. Your "Duty Description" block should show how many soldiers you supervised and the dollar amount of equipment you were responsible for. The senior rater portion should stick to potential. Selection boards are looking for NCOs who show the potential to perform in positions of greater responsibility.

Look for those leadership positions. I know they're not that easy to come by but let it be known that you're interested. Don't stop trying to get that squad leader, platoon sergeant, and first sergeant job. For example, NCOs serving as instructors are in leadership positions; your NCO-ER should emphasize your assets.

It's also very important that you check your microfiche; bounce it off your DA Form 2-A. You don't want the board to find discrepancies between the two. Remember, this is **your** board. Be aggressive in preparing for it. The results could mean a promotion or selection for higher schooling.

To the sergeants major: I'm attempting to upgrade the MI Room at the Sergeants Major Course. I would like you to send me two brigade, battalion, and separate battalion crests. We will place them on a plaque for display in the MI Room. If you have any ideas as to what we can do to improve the room let me know.

Also, there is an article on the Self Development Test in this issue. Take time to read it and make sure your soldiers get this important information. Remember, the FY 92 and 93 iterations of the SDT will not be used for personnel management purposes. Individual results will go to the NCO only. Besides acclimating himself to the test, he can use the results to steer his self development.

The Army has high expectations for the SDT. Properly designed and administered, it should be a highly useful new NCO evaluation tool.

The NCO Evaluation Report has proven to be a success. We have curtailed the inflation, which has dropped from 18 percent to about 2 percent, with all "Excellent" blocks marked. These are some comments we've received from DA centralized selection boards:

- ☐ The NCO-ER works well and is an important evaluation tool.

(Continued on page 55)

FROM THE EDITOR

This issue features a variety of articles covering many aspects of the Military Intelligence experience in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. We've expanded the issue to 64 pages to present as much information as possible. I've selected articles from a broad range of individuals and units. You'll find articles written by some of our younger NCOs and officers, as well as by some of the most senior members of our Corps. The authors served in a variety of assignments at all echelons during the Gulf conflict.

A high degree of initiative has always distinguished the U.S. Army from other fighting forces in the world. As the articles in this issue show, initiative was a key factor in the success of our forces during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Please keep in mind, however, that these articles convey the singular experiences of units, organizations, and individuals; they should not be construed as the Army's official doctrine, policies, or lessons learned from the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experience. The Army and the MI Corps are currently compiling official lessons learned, which should be available to us soon.

One DESERT STORM initiative that certainly will impact how we do our job in the future is the IEW Synchronization Matrix. This matrix, developed and used by the G2 section of the 3d U.S. Army, gives collection managers a way to plan ahead for collection. It synthesizes collection planning with IPB, to give collection managers a way to predict future collection needs. Colonel John H. Black and Captain David J. Rudock explain this matrix, and its use, in their articles.

We appreciate the many fine articles we've been receiving, and we'd like to keep getting them. In this issue, we've finally published a few of the articles we've been holding awhile. Now that the Gulf War is over, we can get to our less perishable topics. Two topics I'd like to highlight in future issues are North Korea and EAC intelligence. If you have an interest in either topic, please consider writing an article for us.

We also need more book reviewers and letter writers! If you like to read, please contact us about our book review program. Or, if you've read an interesting, recently published book that would be of interest to others in MI, please write a review and send it to us. Also, if you disagree, or agree, with something we've published, or think you can add some worthwhile comments to an article, please write a letter to the editor. I've published some articles recently that were a bit controversial, and I expected to get a lot more feedback on them than I did. That is the purpose of an open forum!

Finally, we welcome Roger Johnson to our production staff. He replaced Hermelinda Rodriguez as typesetter. You may notice that we've switched to a different publishing program with this issue, and Mr. Johnson was the key to making that transition as smooth as possible. With his help, we've been able to greatly streamline our production process.

LETTERS

Dear Editor:
Fresh from an outstanding performance in DESERT STORM, the MI community has found renewed confidence in itself and its place in the Army. While some difficulties admittedly remain, the MI community has proven that the many mistakes commonly attributed to it from the Vietnam conflict and more recently Operations JUST CAUSE and URGENT FURY are indeed mistakes of the past, from which valuable lessons have been learned. MI officers and enlisted alike have "just cause" now to be proud of themselves and their profession.

For this reason, I believe it's time to change the MI Soldiers' Creed, specifically, the opening line of the creed. This reads, "I am a soldier first, but an intelligence professional second to none." Many in the MI field with whom I have talked believe this opening line highlights a kind of inferiority complex in the profession, a complex which leads many to question just what an MI soldier is supposed to be.

The revised edition of **The Random House College Dictionary** first defines the conjunction "but" as "on the contrary," as in, "My brother went, but I did not." It goes on to note, "But marks an opposition or contrast, though in a casual way." "But" marks an even stronger opposition than the word "however." This is the most common use, and the use implied in the first line of the creed.

This being said, the first line of the creed implies that being a soldier and being an intelligence professional are inherently mutually exclusive. The rest of the creed, which concentrates on our role in supporting the commander with intelligence, does not elaborate on the "I am a soldier first" phrase. At best, one is left with the opinion that this phrase is given to appease those outside of MI, as though opening the creed with "I am an intelligence professional second to none" would be elitist—the blue beret, green door syndrome. At worst, it shows an uneasiness with the fact that being an MI professional may not be as "soldierly," as the combat arms fields. Somehow, we're embarrassed that we are MI soldiers and not more soldierly soldiers, and need to qualify the fact that we are MI professionals.

The MI profession is not combat arms. MI units are not supposed to make contact with and destroy the enemy. No one would reasonably advocate such use of our MI assets. Indeed, the MI soldier can inflict considerably more damage on the enemy with his technical proficiency then he ever could with his issued weapon.

This fact renders the "soldier first or technician first" argument meaningless. An MI professional cannot be a good soldier without being a technician. MI professionals are useless to the supported commander if they are unable to do their jobs. We have accepted the definition of tactical proficiency in MI as meaning the ability to survive in combat, missing the more important element of being able to do one's job in combat. Tactical proficiency includes technical proficiency, since one cannot do one's job in combat if unable to do one's job to begin with. If an MI soldier is only able to "survive" in combat, then he simply becomes an obstacle on an already crowded battlefield.

The MI soldier's major contribution to the battlefield is his technical skills as an MI professional. This is his duty as a soldier in the U.S. Army, and something in which he should take no less than absolute pride. By being technically and tactically proficient, an MI professional is a soldier second to none.

Thus, I propose that the MI creed be changed to begin with the phrase, "As a military intelligence professional, I am a soldier second to none." This, I believe, would bring a great amount of pride to the MI profession, refocusing our attention on excelling through our technical skills which help win wars. While not neglecting common soldier skills, the MI commander can take as much pride in winning a language olympics, for example, as he could for winning a division run. Outstanding mission accomplishment would be as important as unit percentages for weapons qualifications, physical fitness tests, etc.

It's time for the MI profession to be proud of its contributions to the Army. We are the most highly trained and qualified MI professionals in the world. We should not take pride in competing with the combat arms, but rather in supporting them. We need to grab this opportunity now to reinvigorate such pride in our profession and discard the inferiority complex which has led some of us to lose focus on our roles as MI soldiers.

Staff Sergeant Shawn Terrance
PSC 450, Box 713
APO AP 96206-0713

Dear Editor:
The attention to detail and professional touch provided by the graphics in the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** is always appreciated. It added that very special touch to my article in the July-September 1991 issue, "Operation JUST CAUSE: The Divisional MI Battalion, The Nonlinear Battlefield, and AirLand Operations-Future," and captured its essence in a very graphic way.

However, as a result of editorial and security-driven cuts, a reading of this article could create some confusion in the reader's mind regarding the organizational make up of the 82d Division task force and the supporting MI element involved in this operation. A brief summary should clarify this.

During Operation JUST CAUSE combat and combat support personnel and equipment of a Division Ready Brigade (DRB) task force from the 82d Airborne Division entered Torrijos International Airport by combat parachute assault and equipment heavy drop. The 82d Division Assault

(Continued on page 38)

U.S.
EICHELBERGER

THE MI CORPS: A Vision of the Future

By Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles B. Eichelberger

At the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame dinner at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, on July 12, I gave a speech outlining a vision of the future MI Corps. With all the changes occurring in our Army, and within Army Intelligence, many of you have asked questions about the direction we're taking. I thought it might be useful to publish my speech in order to share with you my thoughts on the future of our Corps. I believe our future is every bit as bright as our past, and despite the downsizing of our Army, I want to assure you the MI Corps is doing well.

This is an era of rapid geopolitical change, characterized by more multipolarity than since before World War II, and, as President Bush points out, by the forming of a **New World Order**. The Army and Army Intelligence are preparing to meet new challenges in a much more complex and technologically sophisticated world.

Our country is confronted by a world in the throes of fundamental and unprecedented change. While the likelihood of super power conflict has lessened, the Soviet Union remains a most formidable land power—a force that still demands attention and one that can still destroy our nation. Additionally, instability in Korea, Latin America, Africa, and Southwest Asia continues, and Eastern Europe will probably be unstable throughout this decade. So, as we look at the world in the year 2000, we don't see it any simpler, nor necessarily a lot safer, than it is today. Both the Army and Army Intelligence are preparing to meet the full spectrum of conflict challenges beyond 2000.

We'll enter this uncertain future with a much smaller and largely CONUS-based Army. But I want to emphasize that it will be a better Army and a more capable MI Corps. As the Army is downsized by about 30 percent, from 735,000 to around 535,000—depending on the final number approved by Congress—our corps will undergo a reasonable and fair share reduction of about 20 to 25 percent. That translates into about a 10,000 personnel reduction over the next 6 years. So, it will be a smaller Army, but, I believe, a better one.

"In the future, our MI battalions which support corps and divisions should be filled to a far higher percentage with high quality soldiers."

Now, let me explain why I think so.

First, although we're cutting manpower authorizations, we should be able to keep most of our higher quality soldiers. Promotion boards will take a hard look at everyone; however, they will eliminate by performance. The Army will keep its higher quality soldiers. Second, up to this point, and at least for the last 30 years, we've only had about a 75 percent fill of our hard-skill MI slots, like those needing occupational specialties 33 (maintenance skills), 98G (linguist skills), etc. But in the future, our MI battalions which support corps and divisions should be filled to a far higher percentage with high quality soldiers in the right occupational skills. This will give us a much more ready MI force than at any time in the past. Although we may lose the spaces, we'll be able to put the faces into our understrength units. So the future should be one of quality, with full TOE units.

Technological Growth

The future is also one of technological growth, as DESERT SHIELD/STORM showed. Our smaller, but quality, force will have even more superior technology working for it. The outstanding performance of the prototype Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System or Joint STARS, the revolutionary potential of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that we used successfully in support of VII Corps' main attack against Iraqi Forces, the advancements in imagery dissemination, and the extensive use of satellite communications reflect only the tip of the technological iceberg for the future capabilities of our MI Corps.

It's important to remember that DESERT STORM didn't create the demand for these capabilities. We understood the need years ago, and many of you fought for funding of these systems. These capabilities and other systems have been in development for nearly 10 years, and it's a top priority of our Army's leadership to field them as soon as possible. To illustrate this support, our share of the Army's budget will increase from approximately $450 million to between $700 to $900 million over the next 5 years. This will ensure that we **finally** field this advanced technology within the next decade.

I'm pleased to report that we're revolutionizing tactical intelligence; our vision will soon become reality. We're about to give war-fighting commanders a true capability to not only see, but to actually shape the battlefield; that all-important value added will be a true targeting capability, provided by the Intelligence Corps. While Congress is reducing the Army's budget, as well as our own, the approved concept for our future war-fighting doctrine places intelligence as a first prerogative. So, I believe the high fiscal priority we've received up to now will be sustained by our new Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan.

Our focus on the battlefield has always been on situation development, but now it will also significantly include targeting. I'm reminded of the popular picture of two buzzards perched on a limb with the caption "Patience, hell, I want to kill something." Well, these new systems will act a little like "buzzards" over the battlefield. Sitting high and deep and watching, they will help us to develop the situation, to know when to strike and where to kill the enemy long before our soldiers come into range of his weapon systems.

The keys to our target development will be accuracy and the direct feeding of priority targets to shooters. We now have the technology to do both very well. In the near future our imagery systems, whether satellite or UAV, and our advanced ground based collectors, whether ground based common sensor, advanced QUICKFIX, or TRACKWOLF, will feed targeting data to common ground stations located in the war fighters' tactical operations centers.

These systems will paint a near real-time picture of the battlefield for both our corps and division commanders. These systems will continually provide targeting data to shooters as a result of our significantly enhanced target development, and hopefully, a significantly improved communications system that will move our high volume data to where ever it's needed on the battlefield. Within the next few years we should have achieved a completely closed loop system between intelligence collectors and weapons targeteers.

In the tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) arena, we'll reduce the amount of SIGINT assets at division level by at least one third. The common sensor technology now in development allows us to do the job much better, faster, and with less equipment and manpower.

While divisions will still perform some collection management, they'll rely more on corps intelligence units to perform the in-depth analysis, thus allowing our divisional resources to concentrate more heavily on targeting. So, at division level, MI battalions will be better balanced. They'll provide a solid mix of ground based common sensors and advanced QUICKFIX for both signals exploitation and jamming, and UAVs and Joint STARS ground stations for imagery. They'll also have ground surveillance and long range reconnaissance capabilities, CI, interrogation, and, hopefully, an all-source analysis system.

"In the HUMINT field, we simply must do better."

HUMINT

Now, let's discuss our activities above corps level. In the human intelligence (HUMINT) field, **we simply must do better**. We have to get a bigger bang for our HUMINT buck and more capability out of fewer resources. Our previous HUMINT management structure was manpower intensive, expensive, and not as efficient or as responsive to our war fighters' needs as it should be. Today, we're in the process of making significant improvement. Above corps level, we will reorganize HUMINT resources and place them in a new foreign intelligence command.

Through streamlined command and control, we'll be able to do more with less resources and be even more responsive to Army collection priorities as our focus will be worldwide, rather than theater specific. We're also developing a closer working relationship with the CIA to enhance our planning and operations. While we've always had high quality HUMINT soldiers, their contributions will increase as we reorganize their command and control and streamline their operational management.

As with HUMINT, the importance of counterintelligence (CI) capabilities is increasing in this new and more complex world. Our focus must be on improving security through the conduct of multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI), which includes counter-

SIGINT, counter-imagery intelligence (C-IMINT), and counter-HUMINT.

"Protecting our war-fighting force remains a primary CI mission."

The CI Mission

One of the challenges we face, in addition to protecting our forces, is to detect and counteract espionage attempts of not just those countries we regard as enemies, but of all foreign intelligence services that seek to diminish our country's military technological advantage by stealing and marketing our best technological developments. This effort will significantly increase in the economic intelligence arena as the new multipolar world focuses more on economic power.

Protecting our war-fighting force remains a primary CI mission. By placing MDCI resources with the opposition forces at the National Training Center, and having them assess our maneuver units' command, control, and communications profiles, we hope to better understand the operational vulnerabilities of our own communications-electronics systems, as well as our operational tactics and doctrine. Through this new initiative, we expect to—

- ☐ Teach more correct use of security procedures and countermeasures.
- ☐ Identify the need for improved doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; deception techniques; and other countermeasures.
- ☐ Develop recommendations for improved communications-electronics systems and their use.

Finally, despite an approximate 20 percent CI force reduction, Army CI has been called upon to play an increasing role in the U.S.-Soviet treaty verification process. This man-intensive effort focuses on on-site inspections for the conventional forces in Europe, as well as verifying compliance with chemical weapons agreements.

Linguist Assets

One of the biggest challenges we have in the MI Corps is how to properly manage our intelligence linguists. Imagine an Army which focuses on power projection with a contingency corps prepared to go anywhere on short notice and one or more reinforcing corps fully prepared to follow. Question: Given this strategy, how would we best assign and develop linguists to fill corps needs to meet nearly any contingency, anywhere, anytime? Well, that Army is tomorrow's force, and that strategy will be tomorrow's strategy, for we will be a CONUS-based Army with **very little** forward presence.

The challenges we're now facing in assignment and development of linguists have never been greater. There are no easy solutions, as many of you may recall when you wrestled with this same problem. As in the past, many of our brightest people are working on this issue. We're leaning toward emphasizing the development of the linguist skills first, then deciding what military skill to award, and possibly even awarding more than one to highly capable linguists. For example, if a linguist is at a 3/3 proficiency level and is able to think in the foreign language, he or she should, with additional training, be capable of serving as both a voice interceptor and an interrogator.

"The challenges we're now facing in assignment and development of linguists have never been greater."

We're also examining the creation of small language battalions or companies which would hold, for contingencies, low density language specialists available for rapid deployment and augmentation to our deploying MI force. To increase our retention of trained linguists, we're trying to increase our foreign language proficiency pay from the current $100 a month to $300, and even to $450 a month for multiple language capabilities. As this requires legislation, we're working closely with Congress to get support. I believe this support will be available.

The Reserves

At the same time, renewed efforts are underway to get soldiers leaving the service to join our Reserve language units. With regard to the Reserves, as our active force is downsized, the Reserves should get more equipment to flesh out their intelligence structure. Where necessary, efforts are also ongoing to procure off-the-shelf equipment for them. As we reshape the MI force, considering changes in the Army's strategy, we will call upon our Reserve soldiers to play increasingly important roles in our corps.

Defense Intelligence Restructure

As you may know, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has directed a restructuring of defense intelligence. Known as Defense Intelligence in the

1990's, this program is headed up by Dwayne Andrews, Assistant Secretary of Defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence. His objective is to streamline defense intelligence to make it more effective and efficient. In so doing, it should better support the needs of DOD, with emphasis on supporting war-fighting commanders in chief (CINCs).

In this initiative, the secretary directed the military departments to form single intelligence commands; in fact, Mr. Andrews used the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) as the model. Likewise, we used the Army Intelligence/CI relationship as the model for changes which the Office of the Secretary of Defense wants to make in the CI field.

In other areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense intends to explore a closer working relationship with the CIA in HUMINT matters, an initiative where, again, we are taking the lead.

Probably the most significant restructuring action is the consolidation of intelligence production functions at the unified command level. Whereas this initiative will actually save Navy and Air Force spaces,

we'll have to increase our participation at this echelon since we historically have allocated our production resources to lower levels. I'll speak of this later.

Finally, we've directed considerable effort at improving the quality of scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) threat assessments associated with major weapon systems development programs. Congress has put great pressure on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, based on a congressional perception that service assessments have been biased, to shift control of all S&TI centers to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). So far, we've succeeded in retaining control of Army-related S&TI production, as it's in our best interest to do so.

But just as the MI Corps is being downsized, so is the defense intelligence community. In this complex international environment, we're becoming increasingly concerned about the quality and volume of intelligence available to our forces for peacetime contingency planning. As budgets are reduced, we believe the DOD/National Community will provide less tactically-oriented intelligence for peacetime planning. Thus, we must face reality and **maximize the potential** of our tactical soldiers to help fill this void. To this end, we've developed the concept of the Corps MI Support Element, or CMISE.

CMISE

The CMISE is a concept which, for the first time, combines a cadre of soldiers funded by strategic/echelons above corps funds (program 3 soldiers) with soldiers assigned to corps and divisions (program 2 soldiers). Multidiscipline in design, this cadre of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and CI soldiers will develop intelligence while in garrison in direct support of their corps commanders' priority intelligence requirements. Assigned to INSCOM, the CMISE cadre will provide direct connectivity to ongoing real-world collection operations conducted by INSCOM's theater brigades in regions of interest to the corps.

Further, INSCOM will give corps access to other CONUS-based and defense level intelligence operations. This will give corps a timely, real-world product they can exploit to develop their own intelligence data bases, target folders, etc., and, in turn, contribute to the national intelligence data base. As a result, corps MI soldiers will be able to improve both their combat readiness and technical skill proficiencies by working with those live targets they would encounter in the event of contingency operations. At last, a way to solve our technical as well as tactical proficiency training issues. Further, the CMISE ensures the corps has a solid opportunity to develop and tailor intelligence data bases in support of its planning.

In addition, by using INSCOM soldiers, the CMISE allows the corps to maintain target continuity during deployment and immediately upon arrival in theater. INSCOM soldiers can also operate our large intelligence processors which might not otherwise deploy on time due to short notice or lift limitations. They can pass products from these processors via satellite communications to forward deployed forces, very similar to the way our Army Intelligence Agency supported our forces in Southwest Asia.

While the CMISE is designed to perform a number of other functions, the bottom line is the time has come for us to leverage the great potential of our tactical intelligence forces to contribute to their own real-world intelligence needs and to supplement our defense intelligence system.

JICs

As part of the ongoing restructuring of the defense intelligence system above corps level, within unified commands, the Secretary of Defense recently directed the consolidation of intelligence production capabilities into new organizations called Joint Intelligence Centers, or JICs. Regionally focused, JICs are intended to satisfy the intelligence needs of unified CINCs and service component forces.

To comply with this directive, we've chosen to provide an element of highly trained Army analysts which would be fully integrated into J2 operations and even be rated by the J2 staff, but would remain "Army Green." That is, they'll be assigned to the INSCOM brigade supporting the theater CINC. By retaining an Army control unit, we believe the Army JIC element can succeed in focusing on specific ground war-fighting data requirements of the Army component and corps, and remain committed to performing ground force related intelligence analysis.

DESERT STORM

I've talked about many of the changes occurring in our MI Corps, but to this point I haven't commented much about our performance or the lessons we learned during Operation DESERT STORM. Let me do that now.

"We should be very careful about generalizing on the lessons we learned in Southwest Asia."

I must start by pointing out that the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations was very much like a pool table. It's one of the few places on earth where you can really do a great intelligence job almost exclusively from space. For this reason, and considering the tendency of the Iraqi soldiers to surrender rather than fight and to not use their radios for fear of our SIGINT systems, we should be very careful about generalizing on the lessons we learned in Southwest Asia. However, I agree with many who note the real lessons learned from DESERT STORM are—

- ☐ Our doctrine works (sure, we had to fine tune it, but tailoring to the situation is always an inherent task).
- ☐ Our commitment to training paid off.
- ☐ Our technological direction is on target.
- ☐ We shouldn't draw too many other conclusions because of the uniqueness of the situation.

Let me say, in general, Army intelligence really worked well. How can you have a conflict against such a potentially strong enemy that lasted only 100 hours and had so few casualties without strong intelligence support? To paraphrase a recent statement by President Bush: Intelligence support to U.S. military commanders—both national and organic—was outstanding during DESERT STORM.

The Gulf War represented many firsts for the MI Corps. For the first time, a UAV flew in support of Army forces in combat. Joint STARS also supported combat operations. As I noted earlier, while both systems are prototypes now, they proved their immeasurable value to commanders. We also used several other prototype intelligence and communications systems which provided reliable intelligence dissemination, including spot imagery, from national to tactical levels.

Despite the uniqueness of DESERT STORM, we learned much. First, our key tactical intelligence problem is data dissemination, to include secondary dissemination of imagery. We must have some form of specialized intelligence communications. We can satisfy this requirement a number of ways, such as by dedicated links provided by our tactical signal units and by direct feeds from national systems down to tactical echelons. We also have a valid requirement to get imagery down to at least division level, and even perhaps to brigade level.

In Southwest Asia, we learned much about performing battle damage assessment, which is an art, not a science. Our Army component did a phenomenal job in piecing together the best possible picture of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy, and, more importantly, assessing his remaining capabilities. Yet, within the defense and national intelligence communities, we still have a long way to go in developing a well coordinated and professional methodology for performing battle damage assessment.

We learned a lot from our foreign military equipment exploitation efforts. The information we gleaned from this program will pay tremendous dividends in developing future battlefield systems and countermeasures.

Our interrogation of enemy prisoners was a staggering effort, but was very successful. Our soldiers interrogated thousands of Iraqis during and after the conflict. We learned that both our interrogators and CI specialists are well trained and play a very important role in successful military operations, but we still have to resolve our linguist shortages in these areas.

"The Army Intelligence Agency played a central part in the operations of the newly established Pentagon/DIA JIC."

Finally, let me note that we played a significant role in the joint intelligence arena during both DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. In Washington, the Army Intelligence Agency played a central part in the operations of the newly established Pentagon/DIA JIC. Through the expertise of these soldiers, DIA was able to provide extraordinary support to both the Central Command J2 and the service components.

The center worked so well that we've institutionalized the concept of service augmentation to DIA and we'll use it in future crises. Our role in the joint intelligence world is increasing and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM helped us develop a more solid doctrine of how we can best support joint commands, defense agencies, and ourselves.

Our Southwest Asia experience **was** successful and rewarding, and it demonstrated again, the important value added by a strong, professional MI Corps. Nearly every senior Army commander said he had never received better intelligence. While we still have a lot of room for improvement to produce the product we know we can provide, we're well on our way.

Conclusion

I've tried to cover a lot of ground here. As I hope you've learned, many innovative and exciting things

are happening in the MI Corps. To make certain what we're doing is smart, I got together with the DCSOPS in the Pentagon and Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr. at the Intelligence Center, to form a special task force to relook these initiatives to make absolutely certain we were heading in the right direction.

Under the leadership of Major General Menoher, the task force, directed by Brigadier General John Stewart (the ARCENT G2 during DESERT STORM), has examined MI **functionally** from top to bottom. The task force considered whether or not our plans will maximize the MI Corps' contribution to the Army in an era of significantly constrained resources, and also integrated Southwest Asia lessons learned. Currently, the task force is completing its findings and, after a general officer committee review and upon their approval, our course will be set; our future architecture established.

As I conclude, let me emphasize again that our future is, in my judgment, even brighter than our past. Our soldiers are of higher caliber than ever and, while we will be smaller, we certainly will be better. After a long wait, **finally** we're on the verge of a revolution in tactical intelligence. The technology we're developing is truly on the mark, as was demonstrated in DESERT STORM.

The vision I've portrayed here is as much yours as it is anyone's. Many of you had the ideas first. You nurtured and developed them. Through all our efforts, the MI Corps is making and will continue to make significant contributions to our Army and particularly to its war fighters. You can be justifiably proud of our Corps, as I am. As our motto states, we're "Always out Front" and I think we still are for the future.

As most of you know, I retired from DCSINT on September 30, 1991. In leaving, I wanted to be sure you got the message from me directly, that regardless of the reductions our Army will undertake in the next few years, the future is not "gloom and doom" as many may have suggested. I think the future of the MI Corps is better than ever. I have served in MI for over 35 years, and I strongly assure you that we have the best Army we've ever had and the best Army Intelligence we've ever had. I leave you with the clear and positive message that it's going to be even better!

I also want to leave with you another last message. I don't know the author nor do I know the source of the material. I can only tell you that this has been very helpful to me during difficult periods in my life; so, I want to share it with you.

"I promise myself to be so strong that nothing can disturb my peace of mind. To talk health, happiness, and prosperity to every person I meet. To make everyone I interact with feel that there is something special about them. To look at the sunny side of everything and make my optimism come true. To think only of the best, to work only for the best, and to expect only the best. To be just as enthusiastic about the success of others as I am about my own. To forget the mistakes of the past and press on to the greater achievements of the future. To wear a cheerful countenance at all times and give every living creature I meet a smile. To give so much time to the improvement of myself that I have no time to criticize others. To be too large for worry, too noble for anger, too strong for fear, and too happy to permit the presence of trouble."

Congratulations on being the superb MI soldiers that your are. Best wishes and may God be with you in all your future endeavors.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles B. Eichelberger entered the service in September 1955 as an enlisted man and was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduating from the Infantry Officer Candidate School in 1957. He has a BS degree from the University of Nebraska and an MA from Pepperdine University. He has completed the MI Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. He's held a wide variety of important command and staff positions culminating in his assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Other key assignments include DCSI, USAREUR; DCSI (J2), USCENTCOM; Deputy Commandant, USAICS; Commander, Field Station Berlin; Commander, 313th ASA Battalion (ABN); and Chief of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Electronic Warfare Division at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, DA.



BOMBING BAGHDAD: AIR FORCE TARGET DEVELOPMENT

By Captain Daniel L. Thomas

Bombing a nation "back into the stone age" requires more exact planning than the resulting rubble would suggest. During the Gulf War, the Coalition flew thousands of sorties a day against nearly every significant military target in Iraq and Kuwait. This historic use of air power required extensive coordination and planning to achieve the commander's objectives.

One vital part of air campaign planning is targeting. This is handled by the combat targeteer, an intelligence officer who applies target analysis to the planning process. Target analysis has several subdisciplines, such as weaponeering and target development. Weaponeering involves the use and potency of different munitions against targets. Target development is like intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for air campaign planning. Air Force Intelligence uses target development to choose targets that will satisfy the bombing campaign's objectives.

The Objectives

The targeteer must know the commander's intent before starting the target development process. The commander's objectives guide the targeteer's analysis and target recommendations. Basically, these objectives become the bombing campaign's general goals:

- ☐ Destroy the enemy's surface-to-surface missile (SSM) delivery capability.
- ☐ Negate his air defense system.
- ☐ Cripple his C^3I link between the national command authority and corps.

After getting the commander's guidance, the targeteer looks for those targets which, if destroyed or disrupted, can best achieve these goals.

Levels of Analysis

Since targets often support each other, targeteers must examine them at many levels. Target development involves analysis at three levels:

- ☐ Target system component analysis.
- ☐ Target system analysis.
- ☐ System interdependence analysis.

Figure 1 breaks down how you examine target components at various levels to develop a list of targets that can best achieve the commander's objectives.

Target System Component Analysis

The first level of analysis looks at target system components. These are industries or utilities that turn out an end product.[1] A target system component is usually an installation, such as an airfield, oil refinery, railroad yard, or command post.

The targeteer analyzes the installation by examining its target elements. These elements are parts of the targeted installation that are essential to its function. Figure 2 shows a thermal power plant as a target with its target elements. Although every element contributes to the installation's final output, electrical power, some elements are crucial to its function. These elements are called critical nodes.

How critical a node is also depends on its ability to be repaired, its vulnerability, and its repair time. For example, destroying the plant's turbines and generator cripples the plant, but the generator building's sturdy construction makes this difficult. Attacking the plant's water supply also could shut the plant down, but since this is easy to fix, the plant could resume operations quickly. On the other hand, the plant's transformers are not only critical but are difficult to repair and relatively easy to hit. Thus, the transformers present the most lucrative aim point.[2]

Next, the targeteer compares the enemy's like components and determines which ones are most important. For example, if a single plant produces 75 percent of the enemy's electrical power, it becomes a higher priority target than all the other plants combined.

Target System Analysis

The second level of analysis, system analysis, examines how different target system components in a geographic area fit together to perform a related function.[3] To find critical nodes, the targeteer examines the importance of each installation or other target type in the overall system.

For example, take a country's surface-to-surface missile system. Targeting missile sites may not be


Target Element
System Component
Target System
System Interaction/ Interdependence
LEVEL 1: Target Components and their Elements
Intricate parts of a system component that are necessary to the installation's function.
Industries or utilities that contribute to the production of an end product. A system component is usually an installation and is referred to as a target.
LEVEL 2: Target Systems
Different target types and installations within a particular geographic area that together perform a functionally related activity.
LEVEL 3: System Interaction/Interdependence
How different target systems interact and rely on one another.

Figure 1. The levels of analysis.



Figure 2. Thermal power plant destruction.



Figure 3. Surface-to-surface missile system.

the solution to knocking out an enemy's SSM system capability. Mobile launchers are tough, if not impossible, to find and destroy, and fixed sites are usually too hardened to penetrate. However, by targeting missile storage sites we knock out the enemy's ability to reload, making it impossible for him to launch his SSMs. (Figure 3 shows a generic SSM system.)

If spare missiles, fuel, or warheads are easier to target and eliminate, the best way to disrupt the system is to target these things. Once again, targeteers appraise the value of each installation's contribution to the system and determine which targets are the most lucrative. These are the keys to an effective bombing campaign.

System Interdependence Analysis

In the third level of analysis, interdependence analysis, the targeteer examines how different systems interact with and rely on one another. Without one system's help, another system may completely collapse. Taken to the extreme, all systems rely on other systems. By damaging key nodes, a bombing campaign also degrades other functions. For example, crippling the enemy's C^3I not only fulfills that objective, but also hurts enemy air defense, SSMs, and other systems as well. At this point the targeteer begins to decide which systems to focus the campaign on to best achieve the commander's objectives.

Putting It All Together

This analysis should give you a list of targets that, if destroyed, will fulfill the commander's objectives. The list combines the prioritized target lists you came up with during component (level one) and system (level two) analysis with a prioritized list or actual operations order, called an air or integrated tasking order, from interdependence (level three) analysis.

For example: During component analysis, several targeteers are assigned different component categories. Each compiles a prioritized list. The targeteers compare these installation lists to other installation lists in the same system, and then develop a prioritized list for the whole system. Final-

ly, a "targets shop" gets together and compares the target lists of the different systems to compile a final list of targets.

Formulas used to develop these lists vary from command to command. Some units use intricate numerical formulas that assign values to each target based on certain characteristics. Others use common sense and give-and-take negotiation between the targeteers of different systems. The end product is a list of priority targets to strike during a conflict.

Conclusion

The Air Force uses the target development process to select installations and systems to destroy. Once target development is complete, weaponeers select the aim points and weapon systems to use, and then construct mission packages.

When the mission is over, analysts assess the battle damage to determine mission success, and then decide whether or not to restrike any targets. Analysts report battle damage assessments back to target development analysts who, in turn, assess the bombing campaign's effectiveness, and repeat the cycle by recommending new targets.

This cycle closely resembles the Army's interaction between operations and intelligence. For example:

- ☐ Bombing campaign objectives are equivalent to the commander's intent.
- ☐ Target development is like IPB.
- ☐ The latter steps resemble the realm of operations, plans, and execution.

This process can be used as a model to understand the development of an Air Force bombing campaign.

End Notes

1. **DAF Pamphlet 200-17, An Introduction to Air Force Targeting** (Washington DC: HQ USAF, June 23, 1989), p. 9-10.
2. **DAF Pamphlet 200-17**, p. 9-10.
3. **JMEN/AS Weaponeering Guide** (61 JTCG/ME-88), Revision 1 (Aberdeen Proving Ground: AMSAA, May 30, 1990), pp. 6-47 thru 6-49.

Captain Daniel L. Thomas is currently a LIC analyst at Joint Intelligence Center Pacific. He previously served as a JIC PAC combat targeting officer. He's also a foreign area officer selectee for the Middle East. Captain Thomas graduated from Colorado State University with a political science major. He was distinguished graduate in the Defense Intelligence College, earning a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence. He has served as a ground surveillance radar platoon leader and a battalion S2.



BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

By Captain John D. Jackson

When USCENTCOM told me I would work battle damage assessment (BDA) during DESERT STORM I thought it was a fate worse than death. I thought BDA would be the most unglamorous, insignificant, and boring job I could get as an intelligence officer. I was wrong. BDA is a challenging analytical field that can serve the commander well. With a good BDA cell, the commander can focus combat power and better use his offensive and defensive assets. The commander does this by using BDA information in his estimate of the situation and by making BDA a consideration in his decision making process.

BDA will tell the commander where and probably when the enemy is weakest. With this information, the commander can choose the best place to exploit the enemy, to maximize shock effect, and to drive deep to the rear, destroying his logistic support and will to fight.

The key to a good BDA cell is organization and simplicity. At USCENTCOM, we used a lap-top computer and a spread sheet program to keep our data organized. The spread sheet program let us keep an audit trail of destruction and any other information used to assess enemy capabilities. It also cut down on dumb arithmetic mistakes. For simplicity, we tried to get our BDA reports in SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) format. The SALUTE report requires all the information you'll need to do BDA, and the operations people already get that report—all you need is a copy from them.

The staff level you're working at will define the kinds of additional BDA reports you'll get. The higher the staff level the more information you're likely to get. More information means better BDA, but it also often means duplicate reporting.

To avoid duplicate reporting, you must eliminate conflicting incoming BDA reports. The most important asset for sorting out conflicting BDA is your reasoning ability. The location, date, time, equipment, and sometimes the reporting element's identity will help you also. To determine whether or not two reports, in fact, cover the same target, look for major similarities between the report elements (date, time, types and numbers of equipment, and location). If all elements are the same or very similar, the reports are probably duplicates. Good reasoning ability, experience, and practice will be your best guide in eliminating duplicate BDA reports.

Depending on what staff level you're working at, you'll probably want to distinguish the source of BDA reports. We used human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) as the source types. We tried to confirm BDA reports gleaned from HUMINT sources by comparing them with the two other sources. For instance, if a pilot said he destroyed six tanks, but IMINT confirmed five tanks destroyed and one damaged, and SIGINT reported five tanks destroyed, then only five tanks were counted as destroyed.

As you've probably guessed, and heard on the news, BDA is not an exact science. It is, however, our job to make BDA as accurate as possible. At best, accurate will probably mean high and low ballpark numbers for what is destroyed. Your goal should be to make the difference between the high and low as small as possible.

BDA is an important job for intelligence officers. BDA reports must be simple; the format should be easy to understand and use. The reports should clarify events, rather than create confusion. Organized BDA data will help eliminate conflict, ensure accuracy, and facilitate reporting to the commander. If you follow these guidelines, you can successfully work in or set up a BDA cell.

Captain Jackson enlisted in the Army as a 98B (Cryptoanalyst) in 1974. He left the Army in 1977 to attend college. Captain Jackson was commissioned through ROTC after graduating from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1983. He has completed MIOBC, the 35G Track Course, MIOAC, CAS^3, and Airborne School. His prior assignments include battalion S2, corps TCAE chief, assistant brigade S3, corps HUMINT collection manager, and NSA liaison officer while in the 525th MI Brigade at Fort Bragg. He is currently the operations officer for Army Europe—TCAE.



APACHE

By Captain Gerard Healy

An effective asset used to gather combat information during the Persian Gulf War was a vehicle designed for an entirely different mission.

The combat role of the AH-64 Apache helicopter is to "kill" tanks. But during the 1-1 Aviation Battalion's 3-day, 130-mile assault into Iraq, the massive columns of enemy armor never materialized. With no tanks to kill, the Apaches quickly reacted to a new mission: The role of intelligence gathering, a role that would directly affect the pace of the battle.

Forward of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech), well into enemy territory, the Apaches relayed to ground commanders the locations of enemy opposition. Those aerial reports allowed the division's 2d Brigade to accelerate its rate of advance and maneuver against the enemy. Additional locations were targeted by artillery as the Apache pilots assumed the role of aerial forward observers.

The Apaches not only provided current combat information but also recorded information for future intelligence analysis. Television cameras and infrared image collectors mounted on the nose of the attack

helicopters recorded the missions on high resolution videotape.

While the real-time information assisted ground commanders, the videotapes became a tool for intelligence analysts. The screening of just one videotape of Apache missions revealed the location of 19 enemy positions, including soldiers and equipment such as tanks, BMPs, and antiaircraft equipment bunkers.

The Apache Advantage

But why were Apaches conducting missions traditionally assigned to an air cavalry unit? And why were they so effective?

The answers to these questions lie in a discussion of the equipment used in the desert environment. Pilots in the air cavalry squadron rely on night vision goggles (NVGs). NVGs have an inherent depth perception weakness. In the Persian Gulf, this weakness was further complicated by the fact there were no structures, illumination, or vegetation—things that normally aid night vision. The depth perception weakness, coupled with the lack of terrain variations, proved to be a major problem for the air cavalry squadron. Also, NVGs can only spot stationary enemy targets up to 500 meters, but the Apache's night vision system can see out up to 10 kilometers.

The Apache's forward looking infrared (FLIR) system also provided a high resolution videotape of the enemy situation. These tapes were available for intelligence analysts and imagery specialists to study later. The pilots used laser range finders, along with the FLIR, to provide an eight-digit grid coordinate location of enemy soldiers and equipment. The pilots reported locations of targeted items and other observed items through S2 channels to division.

A Commander's Vision

The quickness with which the battalion was able to react to the new mission can be traced to a change made in the battalion's mission essential task list (METL) in July 1990. Then, the 2d Brigade commander, with a belief that "every soldier is a reconnaissance soldier," added the cavalry missions to the battalion's METL. Three months later, during exercise GAUNTLET, the new missions were tested.

Training the newly assigned tasks gave the soldiers a "taste" of the missions. They got a chance to get out the cavalry ARTEP manuals and look at the tasks, conditions, and standards—even though the cavalry doesn't have Apaches.

Training with Apaches and OH-58C's in lieu of Cobras and OH-58D's, the pilots incorporated different tactics and flying procedures, capitalizing on the Apache's unique capabilities. Two months later, the battalion arrived in Saudi Arabia.

Combat Performance

The reconnaissance and screening missions were flown over enemy territory under some of the worst conditions pilots could face. In high winds and blowing dust, pilots worked in a cloud bank they described as being "attached to the surface of the earth." The conditions were so hazardous that it's doubtful the mission would have been attempted with any aircraft other than the Apache. In any other aircraft, pilots would have been stretching the limits of the safety margin. Yet, despite the weather, even before the ground war began, the Apache pilots had located the enemy, targeted him, and recorded even deeper echelon objectives.

After the cease fire began, the Apaches continued to gather intelligence. The Apache, responsible for 1st ID screening missions, assisted in screening a front of approximately 140 kilometers. They focused attention on the cities of Samawah and An Nasiriyah.

This mission also required changes in how Apache pilots normally operate. Rather than narrowly focusing on a target, they expanded their focus to take in a wide search range needed for their reconnaissance mission.

Pilots tried to get away from target acquisition and do more detailed analysis. Before each mission, the battalion S2 would update them on division intelligence priorities. Armed with this knowledge and using scanning techniques, the Apache pilots recorded changing levels of activity and the movement of soldiers, equipment, and checkpoints.

Although the Apache's focus should always be on killing tanks, the Gulf War experience proved that the aircraft is also a valuable intelligence gathering tool.

This war clearly demonstrated what the Apache can do in an intelligence role: Identify vehicle markings from as far out as 4,000 meters. The Apache's radar warning and jamming capabilities also enhance its intelligence potential. As the 1st ID's 4th Brigade commander Colonel James Mowery explained: "To effectively kill the enemy, we must find him first, and then fight him on our terms, not his. The Apache assists greatly in doing just that."

Captain Gerard Healy is the assistant EW officer for XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg. He has served as platoon leader and XO of A Company, 5-14th, 1st Brigade, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks, HI. Healy graduated from the MIOAC and was attending the SIGINT course at Fort Huachuca when the Gulf War began. The course was accelerated, and after graduation, he deployed to Saudi Arabia.

DESERT STORM:

A 3d U.S. Army Perspective



By Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr.

This is an extract from Brigadier General Stewart's report, "Operation DESERT STORM—The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G2, 3d U.S. Army."

DESERT STORM made history for Army Intelligence. In certain ways, it set the foundation for the future conduct of tactical intelligence operations. While it is not yet clear just how well MI did, I believe MI's contribution will eventually be recognized as a major factor in the complete success of this operation and in the unprecedentedly low casualties suffered. The bottom line is, MI succeeded in DESERT STORM.

MI Firsts

DESERT STORM marked many firsts for MI. We fielded seven divisional MI battalions and three MI brigades. For the first time, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flew in support of Army forces in combat. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) also supported combat operations. Still prototypes, these systems proved their immeasurable value to commanders. We also deployed several intelligence communications and computer systems which provided reliable intelligence dissemination, including spot imagery, from national to tactical levels.

This article is written from the view of the G2, Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) (or 3d U.S. Army). There are many other viewpoints, and we have and will read and hear about them as well. This article covers two broad areas: Challenges of Army MI from the field, and broad MI issues as developed by the division, corps, and ARCENT commanders and their G2s.

"MI's contribution will eventually be recognized as a major factor in the complete success of this operation."

Organizational Challenges

Initially, our biggest challenge was to establish the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) team and system for the war that loomed in early 1991. Before December, the ARCENT IEW G2 team was small, tailored to support a one-corps field army. In December, however, the President (and the Coalition) gave U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) an offensive mission. As a result, Army forces in Saudi Arabia received reinforcement from the VII Corps. This placed new demands on ARCENT IEW, and a significant metamorphosis occurred. The focal point of intelligence operations shifted from the XVIII Airborne Corps to ARCENT.

Under CG, ARCENT guidance, G2 attacked several major tasks at once. We focused on building trust with corps and division commanders. We learned they were not satisfied with intelligence. They felt they were not getting appropriate support or attention from intelligence, and they wanted imagery photographs. We also had to provide linguists to the corps and the

513th MI Brigade so they could accomplish their intelligence missions.

To enhance intelligence communications, computer, and collection capabilities, we needed to develop an IEW architecture which would link ARCENT with CENTCOM and the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA), and would link ARCENT and corps and divisions together. We expected the arrival of several major systems, such as the UAV, Joint STARS, and TROJAN, which we had to integrate into the overall architecture. Finally, we had to build an ARCENT G2 team.

In late December, ARCENT G2 and the echelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC), 513th MI Brigade, had few people. ARCENT G2 simply could not support 3d U.S. Army in combat with the capabilities on hand. So, we integrated G2 staff sections into the EACIC. This fostered unity of effort. We also brought in other experienced people, nearly doubling our size, but more importantly, maturing our staff significantly.

We at ARCENT G2 worked hard to ensure we were part of the overall CENTCOM intelligence team and responded to the coach—the CENTCOM J2. I met with the J2, Brigadier General Jack Leide, almost daily during January and February before G-Day. He, in turn, gave us a superb liaison officer and provided leadership and support. CENTCOM and ARCENT coordinated all intelligence judgments fully, and published no estimate that was not fully agreed upon.

Liaison was another crucial aspect of this joint operation. Our liaison elements and individuals performed innumerable, invaluable functions, especially identifying problems, exchanging intelligence, and keeping communication open between higher and lower headquarters as well as laterally.

Intelligence Focused Downwardly

One key task in DESERT STORM was to focus all intelligence endeavors downwardly. From the ARCENT view, that was on the corps, and through it to the captains, lieutenants, and sergeants who fought the war.

In exercises, intelligence often supports training objectives which make it less than realistic. In DESERT STORM, intelligence was real. It was a vital battlefield operating system, but the crucial link between what the ARCENT and corps commanders wanted and what intelligence provided did not come about automatically or easily. Building a system that would provide specific intelligence for specific purposes was a very complex task. In completing the task, we faced many challenges.

Building the System—The Challenges

Following is a discussion of some of the challenges we faced.

Finite Collection Systems. First, intelligence collection assets were finite. The enemy limited them even more by only infrequently using their radios. Until just before G-Day, we had very limited HUMINT. Thus, we relied on imagery, which, in turn, was limited by weather and capability shortfalls. We could take wide angle, blurry photos or spot, clear photos. The former severely hampered accuracy. The latter provided clear pictures but muddled our full comprehension of the battlefield. It was like viewing a football game from the Goodyear Blimp with the stadium and city in view and then switching to a linebacker through a high powered, stationary telescope. There was not much in between.

"In DESERT STORM, intelligence was real. It was a vital battlefield operating system."

Competing Requirements. Second, we had competing requirements, many of them from the corps themselves. With multiple number one priorities over an area the size of Montana and with competing requirements from other components and national decision makers, we did not satisfy everyone, all the time. We did, however, focus on the corps and their main efforts.

Intelligence Team in Transition. Third, as described earlier, we were just building the intelligence team at ARCENT level during the December-January period, at the very time when the corps demanded increasing volumes and levels of intelligence detail. By early February, we could respond to corps needs. Then, the ARCENT G2 led theater Army intelligence and became a full member of CENTCOM's joint intelligence team. The start up in January was rocky, but we moved quickly to develop an intrinsic field army intelligence capability.

Communications and Computer Links. Fourth, we had to provide connectivity to rapidly transmit intelligence requirements and responses (including imagery). We built a communications and computer link (called DODIIS) directly into AIA. This gave us on-line computer access to data bases in AIA and DIA. With DODIIS, we could transmit a relatively high volume of imagery from AIA to ARCENT. Next, we established communications, computer, and imagery links with corps and divisions.

With outside help, we deployed TROJAN (for digital and secure voice satellite communications) to corps and divisions, and Army Space Program Office-Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (ASPO-SIDS) (for imagery receive capability) to VII Corps and its divisions. XVIII Airborne Corps used its Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Tactical High Mobility Terminals and other systems to link with downlinks at Fort Bragg for its digital imagery support. This IEW communications system connected Army tactical commanders from remote areas in Saudi Arabia and Iraq with ARCENT and AIA in Riyadh and Washington, respectively.

IEW Synchronization. Fifth, we developed the IEW Synchronization Matrix. Using backwards planning, we looked at what intelligence corps commanders needed and when they needed it, and then planned how to get it to them. The matrix took into account how we would collect, how we would disseminate, and what obstacles we would have to work around. Colonel John Black's article in this issue explains this matrix in detail.

The Top Down Approach. A sixth challenge involved how to provide tactical intelligence to combat commanders. Doctrine says intelligence responsibility in the Army lies at each level of command with the S2/G2. The S2 may need help—from collection assets at brigade, division, or even corps—but he provides tactical intelligence tailored to his battalion commander's priority intelligence requirements. This basic pattern repeats itself through each command level—theoretically.

In DESERT STORM, tactical intelligence mainly came from above, because tactical units were held back at depths which exceeded their organic assets' capabilities for collection. And until units closed with the enemy, that is how it was. It was imperative that national collection and departmental production (read AIA) focus on tactical intelligence.

AIA provided key support to ground units deploying. They produced an unclassified "How They Fight" pamphlet, templates of enemy divisional defensive positions on 1:50,000 maps, and a multiple volume encyclopedia of the Iraqi threat, which included order of battle, tactics, weapon systems, medical intelligence, and chemical and biological warfare capabilities.

Another aspect of the challenge of providing top down tactical intelligence was the need to define what the corps wanted. The system the corps should have used was broken. Of over 400 requests for information (RFIs) we received, only 20 applied to the corps commanders' stated campaign needs. The others were extraneous. Perhaps they held some importance at one time, but they largely fell into the category of academic curiosity. Nevertheless, ARCENT was busily directing limited collection platforms and scarce analytical efforts toward answering these less-than-useful RFI. We changed that by mid-January.

Dissemination. Seventh, a little known or understood task in intelligence is dissemination. Clearly, any basic course lieutenant knows that if a commander does not receive intelligence in time, it is worthless. Dissemination was the Achilles heel of MI. The normal intelligence digital communications system (AUTODIN) was overloaded, and it stayed that way throughout the operation. Immediate reports arrived in 12 hours. Too many bogus RFIs helped cause that, but there were other reasons. In short, the established communications system could not support intelligence requirements. To answer that, we developed the communications capabilities described below, which worked superbly to division level. Dissemination remained a problem below division.

As we produced hard copy material, we had to develop a courier dissemination system, out-of-hide. Of course, the Army always has done this kind of creative, innovative work, but if dissemination is a real need, and it appears that it is, we must structure ourselves for it. In the end, we distributed about 200 pounds of products daily during January and February over great distances.

We fielded ASPO-SIDS to help disseminate digital imagery, and that, or something like it, is a partial answer to imagery for tactical commanders. Through it all we never totally solved the dissemination problem. We probably provided too much to some units. We were definitely late at times. But intelligence did arrive, and commanders had it in their hands when they needed it.

Lucky TAC. Eighth, ARCENT's forward headquarters, or "Lucky TAC," as it was called from General Patton's days, provided an invaluable service. We used it to communicate face-to-face with corps and division commanders and staffs and to solve problems quickly "on the ground." Lucky TAC's G2 operations focused on solving intelligence problems. The ARCENT deputy G2 forward visited the corps personally almost daily to facilitate this. Lucky TAC's problem solving focus was vital to the success of ARCENT's IEW operations.

Operational Challenges

ARCENT G2 had two missions during the air campaign: Develop and validate high value targets in support of the ARCENT commander's and

Photographs courtesy of Captain Al J. Bedgood

"BDA is an art, not a science, and it is an emotional issue."

CINCCENT's priorities; and provide timely, accurate BDA on Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). Both posed major challenges for us.

Targeting. In close, continuous teamwork with ARCENT G3, we developed an overall targeting campaign plan, a target development and validation planning cycle, and a means to nominate accurate targets, daily, in concert with the campaign plan.

We planned the targeting cycle 4 days in advance, to give us time to direct imagery and signals collection assets and to develop accurate target descriptions and locations. Our system worked well, but at first we were not quite in synchronization with CENTCOM and CENTAF. Due to operational necessity, target priorities tended to shift, often within the normal 72-hour cycle. This meant intelligence collection and the resultant target development were sometimes out of synchronization. On those occasions, we often had limited targets. Later in the air campaign, we built a more complete data base of targets, which gave us more flexibility in handling changing priorities.

A second targeting challenge concerned imagery. In January, we had to rely largely on national imagery for targeting, because early on in the air campaign, Iraqi missile air defense still posed a threat to theater imagery aircraft. Later, when theater imagery aircraft flew over targets and provided high resolu-

"We used A-10 reports because A-10's usually fly in tandem and loiter longer."

tion photography, the air campaign began to take a devastating toll on enemy units.

Battle Damage Assessment. ARCENT was responsible for assessing battle damage in the KTO and providing our assessment to CENTCOM. The reasoning went like this: If the start of the ground campaign would occur when air attacks had reduced Iraqi armor and artillery by 50 percent, then ARCENT should make that call, since the Army was to conduct the main attack. The G2 was ARCENT's agent for battle damage assessment (BDA).

BDA is an art, not a science, and it is an emotional issue. First on art: BDA would be easy if every time an air mission struck a target it was immediately imaged. It does not happen that way. Bad weather, enemy air defense, competition for imagery elsewhere, and numerous other factors absolutely preclude following a strike mission with imagery. In fact, imagery taken on targets struck usually lagged by days, not hours. In that time the enemy usually moved, replaced his losses, or took other steps to befuddle the BDA analyst. Moreover, even the best imagery analyst with clear overhead photography often has a hard time telling which tanks are broken and which are not.

Thus, we had to develop a formula and methodology for estimating BDA. We counted two factors: Armored vehicles (tanks, mainly) and artillery. We used A-10 pilot reports, aircraft videos, and high resolution imagery. We counted one third of the pilot reports that labeled targets as destroyed, one half of the aircraft videos, and all reports of destruction from imagery. We used A-10 reports because A-10's usually fly in tandem and loiter longer, and A-10 pilots train in the close air support role. Because of weather, altitude, and air defense, we factored in error. Aircraft videos worked well, but we deleted half of the apparent kills because subsequent imagery generally confirmed only about that amount destroyed.

Emotion arose from two disparate sectors. On one hand, the Air Force believed our BDA was too conservative. On the other hand, national intelligence agencies, using national imagery largely, claimed our BDA was too liberal. They estimated enemy strengths at 80 to 90 percent a few days before G-Day, when we assessed them to be approaching 50 percent. No one really liked the ARCENT BDA, but it was the best we had, and as it turned out, it was about right.

Arabic Linguists. Another significant challenge for ARCENT involved linguists. Arabic is one of the most difficult languages for Americans to learn. Moreover, Army requirements for Arabic are significantly less than other languages. These two factors added up to less Arabic linguists available than we needed for intelligence, let alone for civil affairs and basic interpretation purposes.

One answer to this problem came from our Reserve Component. Specifically, the 142d MI Battalion (Utah National Guard) deployed its Arabic speakers early on. Due to linguist shortages in virtually every unit and functional intelligence element, 142d soldiers served in both corps and in the 513th MI Brigade at field army level. They served as signals intelligence (SIGINT) interceptors and transcribers, interrogators, and interpreters, and they served su-

perbly. This is an outstanding example of Reserve Component MI capabilities and support.

A major response to linguist shortages, organized by DA, DCSINT, was to arrange for Kuwaitis to reinforce U.S. Army intelligence units. They served mainly as SIGINT intercept operators but also helped with document exploitation and interpreter work. The phrase, "We couldn't have done it without 'em," comes to mind.

Maps. As usual, maps were a big issue. In August 1990, the U.S. Government did not have enough updated maps of the right scale for either Saudi Arabia or Iraq. While DMA made magnificent efforts and accomplished much, we simply have to come to grips in the future with a way to provide maps to deploying Army forces.

IEW Emerging Issues

After DESERT STORM, we set about to capture the emerging lessons, large and small, from the battlefield operating system called IEW. We gathered input from the ARCENT staff, and we called on corps and divisions to provide us their conclusions. In mid-April, we met for 4 days with key representatives from G2 staffs and MI units. On the last day, we conducted an executive session with the corps and division G2s, and we came to a consensus on the major issues which emerged for IEW.

We tried to separate those things which were unique to this conflict from those which are worth full consideration because of their universal application. We then looked back at U.S. Army operations in the last decade—URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, and now DESERT STORM—and we tried to discern the threads of commonality that prescribed how intelligence succeeded or failed to support. With these assessments as a baseline, we began to formulate lessons learned.

There were many common themes among the Grenada, Panama, and Gulf operations that impacted intelligence. U.S. forces deployed from numerous bases, over long distances, on short notice, and into situations that put a premium on flexibility. The implications for inteiligence were that deploying units needed support immediately in the way of order of battle, terrain analysis, technical SIGINT data, enemy military materiel capabilities, and current situational intelligence, to name a few key subjects. In the cases of Grenada and the Gulf, we had thin intelligence data bases and few people who worked the area. We virtually had to build intelligence from scratch.

Theoretically, intelligence flows from DIA, through the Unified and Specified Command, to the Army component. That is not the way it works. In all three instances, the appropriate U&S Command did not have the staff capability to manage myriad sudden and urgent wartime requirements. In DESERT SHIELD, AIA stepped in to provide a single point of contact for support and for coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies. That system worked well for the Army.

Sudden orders to deploy to lower priority areas caused other problems as well. In Grenada and the Gulf, maps were not available and doctrinal communications were long-haul, fragile, and unable to

support intelligence traffic. All three operations established common intelligence themes. They placed high demand on counterintelligence (particularly low level source operations), prisoner interrogation and civilian interview, and high resolution real-time imagery.

On imagery, commanders demanded photographs and the Army had only a limited capability to provide them. Other important intelligence areas common to each operation were major efforts on document retrieval and exploitation as well as technical intelligence on foreign materiel. Moreover, each operation required a special debriefing capability, for high ranking and inner circle captives, and large numbers of defectors and other captives. SIGINT operations also had consistent commonality in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf. For disparate reasons, there was almost no tactical SIGINT collection.

Deployment of MI units is also similar in the three operations. Intelligence units tended to deploy well after combat elements. In the Gulf War, echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence units and capabilities arrived virtually after the corps required intelligence products. This was due to command decisions based on risks and trade-offs.

What can we say about these themes? Are they the unique product of some limited actions which bear little relationship on how the Army might operate in the future? I do not believe so. It appears these three experiences of the last 10 years portend more about what the Army will face than what it will not.

We will not have a geographical focus or even a concentration on one "model" enemy or his surrogates. Instead, there will be a high premium on flexibility and on our ability to use high technology and to over match potential foes in strategy, deployment, tactics, and technology. We will have to prepare ourselves better to provide intelligence (and related) support over disparate areas of the globe. We need a broader base of intelligence on many areas of high political and economic interest to the U.S., instead of deep data concentrated in a few areas.

On the operational and tactical levels, we need to put emphasis on dissemination downwardly through Army units and on maximum flexibility in our MI structure and training.

What follows are MI issues, from the 3d U.S. Army perspective, that emerged and were agreed upon by corps and division senior intelligence officers.

Quality Soldiers and Leaders. Army Intelligence was an overall success in DESERT STORM largely because of our high quality soldiers, who performed magnificently at all echelons. Commanders at all levels have said they were consistently pleased with the performance of their G2s and S2s. Notably, captains filled over 90 percent of battalion level S2 positions. Their experience, professionalism, and high degree of technical competence paid great dividends.

"Army Intelligence was an overall success in DESERT STORM largely because of our high quality soldiers."

Not surprisingly, MI women soldiers and officers performed superbly throughout the battle. G2s and MI commanders unanimously recommend opening more MI positions in divisional units to women.

IEW Communications. Army IEW requires better communication and dissemination systems. Those systems need, of course, to be based on the three Rs: Rugged, reliable, and redundant. They also must include embedded communications in every system in which we can do that. Intelligence must arrive on time, or it is useless.

Imagery Architecture. The Army needs to develop an imagery architecture to provide near real-time photography to commanders from corps through brigade. Commanders will not accept message reports of imagery readouts. They want photography. We need to consider improving—

- ☐ Electronic dissemination capabilities in clarity and in reproduction ability.
- ☐ Methods to provide wide-area, high resolution imagery.
- ☐ The means to disseminate hard copy imagery.

On another aspect of imagery, the Army needs to emphasize the requirement for a wide area, high resolution imagery capability. There was none in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and it hurt us. We could not maintain continuity on enemy disposition. At times, we did not know whether the Republican Guards had moved. This was because national imagery was serving higher priorities, and, in any case, national imagery does not have the capability we recommend here.

One final point on imagery: Commanders feel more confident when their own intelligence staffs have a hand in processing it, since questions and answers can be asked and answered at their command level. In sum, the single weakest MI capability

in terms of getting product into the hands of tactical commanders is imagery intelligence (IMINT). We need to make short as well as long term fixes.

Joint STARS. Joint STARS was the single most valuable intelligence and targeting collection system in DESERT STORM. Joint STARS contributed to every "key read" during the ground war. It showed the lack of enemy movement just before the attack. It gave the first and continuous signs of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and was the target development instrument we used for the air attack on fleeing Iraqi convoys on the main road north of Al Jahra. Joint STARS showed the Republican Guards heavy divisions establishing their defense of Basrah. Although, there was other intelligence on all of this, Joint STARS was absolutely instrumental.

As we understand it, current doctrine calls for Joint STARS ground station modules (GSMs) at corps and division. We suggest field army should also have GSM capability. In a multiple corps operation, Joint STARS supports the commanders' need to synchronize the field army battle.

One issue brought up in the use of Joint STARS and the UAV concerned whether these are targeting or intelligence (read situational development) assets. Joint STARS provided a full view of the enemy situation. It told us whether or not enemy units were moving, and if so, in what strength. Then it allowed us to select the key targets (like units moving to blocking positions in the path of the main attack) for attack. Since we can not always attack all targets, the situational development function is crucial to target selection. We need to ensure this message is clearly read and understood.

The overall question of targeting versus intelligence seems to be a moot one. Target development

"Joint STARS was the single most valuable intelligence and targeting collection system in DESERT STORM."

and validation **is** intelligence. It is also part of and drawn from situational development. Therefore, the use of and results from collection systems like Joint STARS and the UAV depend on the commander's priorities and the METT-T factors—mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time. We simply do not have enough collection systems to relegate them to one specific function.

Balanced Collection Capability. We need to balance intelligence collection capabilities at corps and divisions, and current TRADOC plans call for just that. The MI battalion (CEWI) idea at division is a good one, but CEWI's contributions to URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, and now DESERT STORM were significantly less than expected. Currently, the units are too heavy in SIGINT, too light in HUMINT, and lack an IMINT capability. We must make sure there is a good mix of capabilities that are designed to maintain technological over match and to give CEWI more collection flexibility.

IEW Doctrine and Training. The basics of IEW doctrine are sound, but some areas need refinement. We developed a means to focus all intelligence efforts on specific commander requirements which emanated from the ground campaign plan. The IEW Synchronization Matrix satisfied this requirement. It goes beyond a simple chart that

matches requirements with collection assets, and it is much more than a collection plan. The IEW Synchronization Matrix is, in fact, a methodology that links all intelligence functions of the cycle to an end result: Intelligence specifically tailored to a commander's requirement and delivered at the time of his choosing.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix served our purpose in DESERT STORM because of the inherent nature of the operation. DESERT STORM was a fast tempo offensive operation, characterized by—

- ☐ Units being held well back from the enemy before the attack.
- ☐ Deception.
- ☐ Quick and continuous movement.
- ☐ A need for highly detailed knowledge of the enemy.

Tactical intelligence needed to flow downwardly. Under normal doctrinal circumstances, G2s support their own commander. In DESERT STORM, the field army focused nearly all intelligence collection **and** production on corps and division needs. This meant that MI people had to think and be organized to provide tactical intelligence to echelons well below their own.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix, with its inherent flexibility, served as the primary intelligence operations plan to carry out top-down intelligence support in this major offensive operation. We are not sure how much impact this operation and its intelligence support characteristics should have on overall doctrine; however, we are convinced that the offensive conducted here caused us to use a very different approach to tactical intelligence than described in current field manuals.

Another aspect of doctrine worth a careful relook is analysis. Commanders consistently claimed that much intelligence from their own staffs and from higher tended to be history or myriad specific facts without a predictive element describing what it all meant and what the enemy would do. We should review how we train S2s and analysts to emphasize the assessment and estimative aspects of their work. Moreover, we should move away from periodic intelligence summaries and toward tailored graphic intelligence reports. This would reduce pressure on communications and focus intelligence on value-added to the commander's scheme of maneuver.

MI has emphasized doctrine and training on the very complex and difficult task of collection management over the past decade, and that paid off here. We relearned some key lessons on RFIs (as described above) and especially on linking collection with production. The IEW Synchronization Matrix made us assess each detail of collection platform capability to determine acquisition and processing times, production steps, and dissemination challenges.

Moreover, we knew precisely what we wanted, and we knew the limitations of each system. We did not have the luxury, as often happens in exercises or in peacetime, to throw assets over an area and vacuum everything up, leaving it to the analyst to sort out the answers to a requirement. We had to bring collection and production together in the same effort.

This worked at field army. It probably would work at corps. Its applicability at division, brigade, or battalion remains a question. Nevertheless, we learned much about operational employment of intelligence collection, and our lesson bears application in doctrine and training.

We learned that including the technical control and analysis element (TCAE) within the intelligence center (IC) served intelligence well. The XVIII Airborne Corps did this as well, and their operation benefited greatly from it. We suggest that a review be made to determine whether TCAE/IC collocation is appropriate at division level and whether integration (vice collocation) should be done. We lean in the latter direction, but this issue needs full analysis.

This leads to another implication: Cross training. MI is doing a great deal to cross train soldiers in functions related to their core specialty. In our experience here, an all source analyst and a SIGINT traffic analyst could do each other's work. Moreover, there is potential for an interrogator and a SIGINT intercept operator to perform each other's roles.

"EAC, theater field army intelligence played a crucial role in DESERT STORM."

EAC Intelligence Support: 513th MI Brigade. EAC, theater field army intelligence played a crucial role in DESERT STORM. The 513th MI Brigade performed magnificently and its capabilities were absolutely instrumental in the success of this effort. The one irony was that the brigade, with its capabilities to support field army, was not allowed to deploy until late in DESERT SHIELD. That aside, its operations were the glue that cemented 3d Army's MI efforts. The 513th proved the EAC MI Brigade

concept fully. Their SIGINT and interrogation operations were superb.

Finally, it is clear that having an MI unit with commander and staff working in support of a G2 is a doctrinal tenet that MI must hold. Before and during DESERT STORM, we in 3d Army G2 (like everyone else) had myriad requirements. We met them largely because of the 513th MI Brigade's capabilities and responsiveness.

During this operation, the EAC MI brigade became what doctrine intended it to be: The key MI capability at army level. Corps and divisions looked to the brigade for intelligence support and came to trust the unit fully.

Army Operations Require Army Intelligence. Another major lesson is that to support Army operations, Army intelligence was absolutely required. While we operated fully under the joint command and, in fact, supported CENTCOM in every way, there was no substitute for Army intelligence soldiers in Army MI organizations supporting Army combat commanders. By organization, training, inclination, institutional culture, professional experience, and intuitive knowledge, Army G2s, MI unit commanders, and their subordinates understood ground combat operations and the intelligence requirements thereof.

This means to me that trends toward centralizing intelligence at joint levels are precisely opposite of what we experienced here. What commanders demanded was control over their own destinies, with tailored tactical intelligence from experienced professionals who knew Army operations, the intelligence exigencies that stem from them, and how to lead intelligence maneuver to support command intent.

There is a vast difference between peacetime intelligence and intelligence for strategic purposes versus tactical and operational intelligence in support of commanders who have to make decisions that affect soldiers' lives and the outcome of battles. In our effort to "reduce duplication" by centralizing intelligence at joint levels, we can not at the same time eliminate crucial capability. Intelligence must be complementary for each commander.

MI Reserve Forces. One last comment on MI Reserves deserves mention here. With the exception of a CI unit that served a short period during DESERT SHIELD, the 142d MI Battalion, and the 24th MIBARS from New York, MI Reserve units largely played no role in DESERT STORM. There are many reasons for this, lack of readiness being the main one. Nevertheless, we conclude from this operation that MI Reservists contributed the most as individuals with special skills: Language, regional experience, special interrogation capabilities, to name a few. Individual augmentation by Reservists gave us flexibility to reinforce units with the special skills required for evolving missions. We suggest, therefore, that as our MI strategy for the Reserve Component.

"It was the MI soldier and leader who made this MI operation a success."

Conclusion

In conclusion, IEW functioned as a very effective battlefield operating system in support of DESERT STORM. The MI Corps came together to make that happen. More than any other, three key elements contributed to the success of Army MI:

- ☐ A constant, urgent intelligence focus on tactical support downwardly.
- ☐ Superbly trained MI soldiers.
- ☐ An IEW communications and computer system.

Aside from technology, our efforts to focus and draw from all levels of intelligence to serve the needs of war fighters helped make this operation, perhaps more than any other, an unqualified intelligence success. However, probably the most important ingredient to ensure future contributions of the Army IEW battlefield operating system is the preparation of the MI soldier and leader.

Over the last 10 years, MI came to emphasize tactical proficiency, doctrine, and training. Recently, the Army placed priority on quality and maturity at combat battalion S2 positions. The years of developing doctrine, techniques, and procedures, and, most importantly, well prepared people, paid off clearly in the Gulf. That trend, more than any other, is our legacy and our future. For in the final analysis, it was the MI soldier and leader who made this MI operation a success.

Brigadier General John F. Stewart, Jr. received an ROTC commission in 1962 from San Jose State University, and later earned an MA from Johns Hopkins University. He has attended the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the MIOAC, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Inter-American Defense College. A Latin American Foreign Area Officer, Brigadier General Stewart is fluent in Spanish. His assignments include Commanding General, AIA/Assistant DCSINT, ODCSINT; J2, USSOUTHCOM; XVIII Airborne Corps G2; Commander, 525th MI Brigade; Assistant Army Attache in Mexico City; Commander, 109th MI Battalion (CEWI); G2, 9th Infantry Division; Intelligence Officer, Free World Division, DIA; and Intelligence Officer and Senior Intelligence Analyst, J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Brigadier General Stewart currently serves as the Special Assistant to the DCSINT.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix

By Colonel John H. Black

One of the most exciting intelligence techniques and procedures to come out of Operation DESERT STORM is the IEW Synchronization Matrix. The idea began with the 3d U.S. Army's G2 staff in January 1991, while attempting to focus all intelligence efforts on the tactical commander's needs.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix is an evolutionary step in the well established intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and collection management process. It recognizes that, for the IEW battlefield operating system to be an effective combat multiplier, IEW operations must be totally synchronized with the ground commander's operations. The IEW Synchronization Matrix focuses on precisely **what** intelligence war-fighting commanders need and **when** they need it. When properly developed and used, the matrix allows intelligence officers to optimize collection and dissemination, while focusing scarce collection assets to answer the commander's needs, in a timely manner.

The development of the IEW Synchronization Matrix begins after the operations plan is well developed and an execution matrix is available. Figure 1 shows the execution matrix. This matrix contains operational events, decision points, and timelines. Together, these identify key times in the battle when critical friendly events will occur. The intelligence staff must understand the matrix completely to successfully anticipate the commander's requirements.

Since the purpose of the IEW Synchronization Matrix is to focus all collection, production, and dissemination efforts on the commander's intelligence requirements, the next section of the matrix consists

Getting the "Razor's Edge" on Collection Management

By Captain David J. "Razor" Rudock

Many new methods and tools to assist in day-to-day intelligence operations came out of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. One such device was the IEW Synchronization Matrix. Although it vaguely resembles an event template, it has proven to be a much more valuable tool to the collection manager than the simple series of time-lines depicted in the usual event template.

The 1st Cavalry Division used the IEW Synchronization Matrix with great success during DESERT STORM, and subsequently during several corps and division level exercises. As the theater reserve, our mission required us to focus our intelligence collection on the entire theater of operations instead of on normal doctrinal frontages for a division.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix gave us the tool to accomplish this difficult mission. It allowed the collection manager to quickly see the commander's PIR, what systems to use to answer them, and the asset availability time. Perhaps even more importantly, it clearly showed the gaps in our intelligence coverage.

After the ground war ended and the 1st Cavalry Division returned to Fort Hood, the G2 still believed the synchronization matrix could be a valuable collection tool.

However, we modified it to list our division's organic intelligence assets, and those which we could expect to have access to through corps and echelons above corps. In the First Cavalry Division, our modified matrix is called the "**Razor's Edge**." An example of our completed matrix is at Figure 3.

As I stated earlier, an important use of the


G-DAY
H-Hour
G+1
-8 -6 -4 -2 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
Occupy objective A.
Occupy objective B.
5th Armor occupy objective C.
5th Armor attack/seize objective A. On order, seize objective C.
3d Airborne assault/seize objective B.
5th Armor attack/seize objective C.
LEGEND:
* - Decision point

Figure 1. Execution matrix (friendly forces).


G-DAY
H-Hour
G+1
-8 -6 -4 -2 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40
1
2
3
4
5
LEGEND:
1 - Breach activity, disposition of 25th Division.
2 - Same as 1, plus disposition of 97th Tank Division.
3 - Disposition of 26th Division.
4 - Movement of 97th Tank Division.
5 - Movement of 26th Division.

Figure 2. Preplanned PIR.

of time sequenced preplanned priority intelligence requirements (PIR) (during DESERT STORM we called these "key reads"). "Preplanned PIR" are what we expect the commander's future PIR to be as the operation develops. Figure 2 shows preplanned PIR.

Together, the G2, G3, and the commander coordinate to develop the preplanned PIR. The most effective development of these preplanned PIR occurs when the commander war-games the plan with the G2 and G3. For example, a corps commander, while war-gaming a breach operation might state: "I must know where the enemy's 25th Infantry Division defenses are and how he is disposed...where his obtacles and indirect fire weapon systems are...also I need to know about any movement by the 97th Tank Division that can counterattack our efforts." The commander's war-gaming effort is the foundation for developing the preplanned PIR. This takes constant coordination between army, corps and division G2s, G2/G3s, and the G2/commander.

After establishing the preplanned PIR along the bottom of the matrix, we can backward plan collection, production, and dissemination efforts to answer the PIR. On the synchronization matrix this is represented by an intelligence collection schedule. Figure 3 shows a completed IEW Synchronization Matrix, in this case, for the 1st Cavalry Division (see Captain Rudock's article). Their collection schedule is in the center of the matrix. The collection schedule shows the planned coverage times of the various collectors available to the headquarters constructing the matrix. The collection times are driven by the requirement to answer the commander's PIR and not by the agency or unit owning the assets. The IEW Synchronization Matrix must be coordinated in detail with subordinate commands and your higher headquarters.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix worked to bring all intelligence functions together to focus on the war-fighter's needs for intelligence during Operation DESERT STORM. It is a dynamic, flexible plan that successfully synthesizes IPB and collection planning; therefore, we think it has application in our IEW doctrine. We are working on a White Paper which describes IEW synchronization planning in more detail. Our goal is to provide a copy of the White Paper for comment to all G2s and senior intelligence officers by the end of October.

Colonel Black served on the 3d Army G2 Staff during Operation DESERT STORM. He supervised collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence for the Army component. He currently is the Director of DTIMS, U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Colonel Black has served as the Commander, 105th MI Battalion, 5th Infantry Division (M) and in several intelligence positions from squadron S2 through corps and EAC in Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and CONUS. He has a BA in history from Fort Lewis College and an MBA from Idaho State University. Colonel Black is a graduate of the Infantry OCS, Post Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP), EW-Crypto Tactical Operations Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Naval War College.

matrix was to show the collection manager where gaps in the intelligence coverage existed; it enabled the collection manager to fill these gaps.

Ideally, no gaps in intelligence coverage would exist. Since this is not often the case, we have discovered another use for the "**Razor's Edge.**" It illustratively shows the commander that we cannot answer one of his preplanned PIR, known as "key reads," due to a gap in intelligence coverage. Because of the importance of the information and the possible adverse impact on his successful execution of the mission, we can recommend that he ask the corps commander to reprioritize assets for the pending mission.

The IEW Synchronization Matrix, at least in our division, has proven its usefulness as an important tool in proactive collection management. Just as importantly, it has provided the G2 and the commander a quick method of seeing when and where answers to PIR are needed. In essence, it gives the commander and the G2 the "**Razor's Edge**" in making the critical decisions required during wartime.

Captain David J. Rudock is assigned to the Collection Management Section, G2, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He's a graduate of the University of South Carolina. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Air Defense Officer Basic Course, the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (nonresident), and CAS^3. Captain Rudock has served as platoon leader, ADA battery executive officer, and company commander. In addition, he has served as an intelligence liaison officer to the VII (ROKA) Corps, and he participated in the Gulf conflict.

Figure 3. The 1st Cavalry Division IEW Synchronization Matrix ("Razor's Edge")


O/O 1 CAV ATTACKS TO DEST ENEMY ON OBJ KANSAS/LAREDO
H-12
H+17
H+22
EMENT AT POSI-
3D BDE ATKS TO DESTROY ENEMY ON OBJ JOLIET 1
2D BDE ATKS TO DESTROY ENEMY OBJ JOLIET II/PARIS
CAV ATTACKS TO DESTROY ARMOR MOVING SOUTH TOWARD OBJ JOLIET/KANSAS
LEAD ELEMENTS ARRIVE OBJ JOLIET
2X MRR DESTROYED
ENCE COLLECTION
NATL EO
TACREP
JSTARS
ELINT (EAC)
SIGINT (EAC)
GUARDRAIL
QUICKLOOK
OV-1D (SLAR)
UAV
ELINT (DIV)
QUICKFIX
OH58D
TRAILBLAZER
TRQ-32
EAC
CORPS
DIVISION
12
15
17
20
22
A
52 AD (MOVT/ACTIVITY OF 2D ECH RGTs)
522 MD (ACTIVITY/LOC 1st ECH RGTs/BNs)
LOC/DISP EN ADA
522 MD (INDICATIONS OF MOVT SOUTH BY AR/MECH UNITS)
LEGEND:
Preplanned PIR



Joint Interrogation Facility OPERATIONS

By Sergeant Cheryl Stewart

Prisoner interrogation often conjures up the most horrid images, as depicted on the movie screen. But in Operation DESERT STORM, the reality was quite different. The 202d MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, operated two Joint Interrogation Facilities (JIF) that were highly efficient and productive. The interrogations conducted there, in a humane and orderly fashion, yielded information that, undoubtedly, helped save allied lives.

For example, interrogations revealed invaluable information on the much-publicized mine fields lining the triborder area (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). After their capture, Iraqi prisoners of war who had laid the mines drew detailed maps of the breach points in the mine field. This gave allied troops an unimpeded crossing point. Also, as a direct result of interrogation, JIF personnel obtained information concerning then unknown ammunition points and enemy headquarters. These were immediately put on the target list for allied bombing raids.

The Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), directed the Commander, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) (the ground component commander), to oversee interrogation exploitation within the theater of operations. ARCENT turned over operational control to the 513th MI Brigade, which turned over the reins to Alpha Company, 202d MI Battalion. The battalion set up the two JIF sites: One in Eastern Saudi Arabia, approximately 70 miles from Kuwait; and the other in Western Saudi Arabia, approximately 50 miles from the Iraqi border.

Because this was a multiservice operation, Air Force, Navy, Marine, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel augmented Alpha Company. Even members of the Kuwaiti Navy and Kuwaiti augmentees to the U.S. Army were attached to provide linguistic support.

The Mission

The overall mission of the JIFs was to collect and analyze human intelligence (HUMINT) from enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), refugees, civilian internees, and displaced persons. The JIFs did this through extensive debriefings and interrogations. Due to the tremendous influx of EPWs, JIF personnel had to swiftly screen thousands of EPWs, interrogate them, and disseminate numerous intelligence information reports (IIRs) and knowledgeability briefs. Much of the information gathered and reported was instrumental in shaping air strikes and ground attacks.

The exploitation process, from EPW arrival to information dissemination, was precise and systematic. JIF personnel needed to gather the most relevant information as quickly as possible, since it was usually perishable. EPWs would arrive at one of the JIF sites, where they were stripped of their clothes and issued new ones. JIF personnel confiscated any documents in the EPWs' possession and forwarded them to document exploitation teams for translation.

JIF personnel were also instrumental in rounding out the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) generated by USCENTCOM. Commanders, chief interrogators, order of battle (OB) technicians, and even the screeners themselves would expand on specific information requirements. Screeners often used initiative to broaden questioning of an EPW if they felt the EPW might have knowledge that could benefit the total war effort.

Screening

Screeners questioned EPWs to answer PIR about the Iraqi soldier's willingness to fight and the condition and whereabouts of allied POWs. This was the ideal time to gather information about POWs and MIAs, information that would help ease people's minds back home and would help with future prisoner exchange. Fortunately, some of these questions paid off. One EPW questioned had physically processed some of our POWs and was able to give us information on their status, general condition, and approximate whereabouts.

It wasn't unusual for a screener to process over 100 EPWs a day. The sheer repetition made the

operation difficult and stressful. Initially, the elements proved especially grueling for the screeners, who had to conduct screenings outside, sitting in the sun and sand all day. Yet the screeners were an integral part of the operation, since they were the ones who categorized EPWs for further interrogation.

The screeners categorized EPWs alphabetically by level of knowledge, and numerically by willingness to talk. Category A1 EPWs, those with the most relevant information and who were willing to talk, were the most desirable sources. Category B EPWs possessed important peripheral information. Most EPWs talked willingly because of their overall reluctance to fight in the war.

Once the screeners categorized the EPWs, they segregated and moved them to a holding area. At this point, an interrogator would be assigned. Whenever possible, the interrogator and the EPW were matched up, based on the EPW's willingness to talk compared to the interrogator's level of experience. The match was also based on personality, and the interrogator's knowledge of the EPW.

Interrogating

Before interrogating, the interrogators did research to establish "undeniable information" (information the EPW must have if he is who he says he is). They held a research session which included interrogators and OB analysts. Both parties sat down and determined what unit the EPW was from and what information was needed from him. Once again, the interrogation's emphasis was on information to answer the commander's PIR. OB analysts guided the interrogators' questioning on all facets of the ground war, such as composition, disposition, strengths, and tactics. Next, the interrogator would sit down with the chief interrogator to prioritize the areas to be included in the session, based on the information commanders wanted them to collect.

Because of the EPWs' general willingness to talk, interrogators found that a common sense approach worked best for extracting information. They asked questions like "We know where your unit is; how did they get there?" Most EPWs cooperated readily in answering these questions. More experienced interrogators were assigned to question the few EPWs who were less cooperative. These interrogators used more sophisticated interrogation techniques. Mental and physical cruelty is prohibited under the Laws of Land Warfare and, of course, was not used.

Many EPWs were surprised by the amount of information our forces had. Fortunately for the allied forces, the Iraqis' ability to gather intelligence was poor. Typically, we knew more about their situation than they did. Those who had direct contact with the EPWs learned that the Iraqi soldiers often were unaware of the true situation they faced. Case in point: Soldiers in the Iraqi western divisions were told they would be facing one to two allied divisions across the border, when in fact, there were more than two corps waiting.

Also instrumental in the operation's success were the OB analysts, who were responsible for the timely and accurate portrayal of Iraqi ground forces. They interfaced directly with the interrogators, so all questioning could be directed in a strategic as opposed to a tactical mode. Based on our intelligence, the OB shop plotted known Iraqi divisions. They then went one step further, providing a source overlay and a line and block chart based purely on information gathered from EPWs. With these overlays, they could assess an EPW's value as a reliable source.

Reporting

After the session, the interrogator would generate an IIR. The chief interrogator and the operations officer would review it for accuracy and completeness. Once they finalized it, they would release it through message traffic to all theater level commands and national agencies. Then the EPW was taken back to the general population in the EPW compound.

Although this appears to be a lengthy process, it had to move swiftly. Interrogators needed to extract information quickly, generate timely reports, and disseminate them to the highest levels of command. This intelligence helped commanders make the decisions that affected the overall conduct and outcome of the war. It wasn't easy, however, because of the perishable nature of the information and the repeated breakdowns in field communications.

Conclusion

Collectively, this was the most challenging experience of our soldiers' careers. For 18 months, interrogators and OB analysts had trained diligently for this type of scenario. They had concentrated on intensive "in language" interrogation and had trained interrogators to work with interpreters. Fortunately, when the war came, the pieces of the puzzle came together.

Looking back on what we accomplished, the most important lesson we learned was that flexibility, perseverance, and solid, thorough training are the keys to success.

Even though there was a tremendous influx of EPWs once the ground war began, theater commanders had actually expected more than we got. Commanders told the JIFs to expect approximately 100,000 EPWs, yet only about 60,000 arrived. There

were at least two reasons for this: First, there was a general threat among the Iraqis that if they deserted, their families would be executed; second, internal execution squads would infiltrate Iraqi units to pinpoint and execute anyone likely to desert.

This was the first time in 50 years that HUMINT has been used to this extent, and it proved itself to be extremely accurate. All the technical equipment at the Coalition's disposal—electronic, photographic, and physical reconnaissance—couldn't qualify data to this level. The intelligence gathered undoubtedly contributed to saving thousands of Coalition lives and contributed significantly to the overall victory.

Sergeant Cheryl Stewart is the Personnel Staff NCO for the 202d MI Battalion. She has also served as the Public Affairs Specialist for the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, Fort Monmouth. Stewart has a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Journalism from Central Michigan University.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 5)

Command Post (CP) provided overall command and control for the operation. The 82d assault element parachuted into Torrijos behind a Ranger battalion tasked with the mission of eliminating Panamanian Defence Force (PDF) resistance at Tocumen military airfield to the north and immediately adjacent to Torrijos. The airborne insertion was simply a means of forced entry for the 82d. The most critical part of the plan called for the 82d Airborne Division (-) to assemble all airborne personnel at the airport and to immediately conduct follow on air assault operations with its three battalion task forces. Each of these task forces attacked one of three PDF base strong points located 12 to 15 km from Torrijos at Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron. Subsequent operations would later bring elements of the 82d into the heart of Panama City to conduct security operations, once the situation had stabilized within the city. The 82d DRB task force involved in this Pacific area of operations returned home after successfully completing its mission in less than 30 days. A fourth additional infantry battalion from the 82d was involved in operations along with the 7th Infantry Division in the Atlantic area of operations, but didn't take part in the parachute assault.

The habitual relationship described in the article refers to the distribution of the 313th MI's three identical MI companies with their respective infantry brigades. However, during this operation only one augmented MI Company from the 313th MI Battalion supported the single DRB involved in this operation. Teams from this company were equally distributed among the three battalion task forces that participated in the air assault operations.

Lieutenant Colonel
Victor M. Rosello
XVIII Airborne Corps
Fort Bragg, NC

Dear Editor:

I'm writing to comment on Dr. Karl Seger's article "Iraqi Sponsored Terrorism: Target America?" in your April-June 1991 issue. As a terrorism analyst with DOD, I find it disturbing that someone who is a "terrorism consultant" to the Army and other government agencies could publish such a poorly researched article. Many of Dr. Seger's "facts" concerning various terrorist organizations are without merit (which is probably why he didn't footnote them) or are irrelevant to the terrorism problem.

For example, Palestinian groups such as the PFLP and DFLP have not conducted anti-U.S. attacks in years. They operate exclusively against Israel from bases in Lebanon and Syria. The PFLP-GC, headquartered in and sponsored by Syria, was likely stopped by President Asad from conducting any attacks due to Syria's siding with the Coalition. It's highly unlikely the Egyptian Parliamentary Speaker's assassination was anything other than a strictly internal affair, as Egyptian government press reports soon confirmed. (Had it been an ANO operation, the Egyptian government would have had a propaganda field day.) I can find no references to the alleged incident mentioned in Lebanon in October 1990 concerning the four ANO operatives. And even if it were true, the level of violence in Lebanon was so high at the time that this single incident would be moot. Once again, if Dr. Seger had footnoted his article, it would be easier to cross reference these things.

The Gulf War proved, as previously demonstrated after Operation JUST CAUSE and the 1986 Libya air strike, that indigenous terrorists in Latin America and Europe (usually Turkey and Greece) conduct the vast majority of anti-U.S. terrorism. These groups use U.S. military action elsewhere as a justification for their own local anti-U.S. agendas, not at the direction of some omnipotent "hidden hand." MRTA has always used U.S. military action as an opportunistic excuse to attack U.S. interests in Peru, and is not reliant on the rather spurious Iraq-Cuba link that Dr. Seger suggests. State sponsors are the key to international terrorism, and in this case the traditional sponsors (Syria, Libya, Iran) had no stake in Iraq's survival. Expulsions, international cooperation, and good old-fashioned police work quickly destroyed Iraq's own network of intelligence officers and surrogates.

I suggest that in the future, Dr. Seger and other terrorism analysts turn to some of the excellent open source material available from the U.S. State Department, such as **Terrorist Group Profiles** (1988) or **Patterns of Global Terrorism** (annual), to conduct their background research. This will lead to a less sensationalist and more factual, level-headed assessment of the terrorist problem. This is what the military consumer **really** needs.

Aaron A. Danis
U.S. Navy Anti-Terrorism Alert Center (NAVATAC)
Washington, D.C.

DEEP ATTACK:
A Military Intelligence Task Force in DESERT STORM

By Major Daniel F. Baker

During DESERT STORM's ground campaign, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment led the VII Corps on a fast-paced end sweep of Iraqi defenses. The 2d ACR was the first U.S. unit to occupy a portion of Iraq. As the 2d ACR's organic MI unit, the 502d MI Company formed the nucleus of an intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) task force that supported 2d ACR operations. As such, our MI task force was the first MI unit to conduct IEW operations conventionally on the offense on a large scale. This is an account of the 502d's experience during Operation DESERT STORM. Hopefully, it will give others insight on planning and conducting IEW operations on the offense.

For the 502d, Operation DESERT STORM was a curious mixture of success and frustration. The company, with augmentation, met the regiment's tactical IEW needs and was fully successful in its mission. However, the unique aspects of the conflict—or, more precisely, of the enemy—resulted in limited electronic warfare (EW) products and severely strained interrogation resources. This is a reversal of the mission contributions current doctrine and force structure anticipate.

We did a better job of anticipating our regiment's IEW needs, and we formed a task force that could meet them. The IEW task force included the 502d MI Company, B Co/511 MI Bn, a 25-soldier support element from HHS/511 MI Bn, an interrogation team

from A/511 MI Bn, two radio teletypewriter (RATT) teams from D/307 MI Bn, a TRQ-32(V) team from Det 101/101 MI Bn/1ID, 26 Kuwaiti army officers and soldiers, and one Saudi army NCO. The IEW task force had operational control of the regiment's QUICKFIX platoon and an MP platoon for enemy prisoner of war (EPW) security.

For equipment, the task force had six TRQ-32(V)'s, five MLQ-34's, three MSQ-103's, and two TLQ-17A's. Only two of its three authorized QUICKFIX systems were available. The task force didn't have a technical control and analysis center-division.

Organization

We organized the task force to accommodate distinct 502d MI and B/511 organizations. While the 502d MI had two collection and jamming (C&J) platoons, B/511 had platoons built around individual systems. These two companies had never trained together before and weren't familiar with each other's operational procedures.

We based task organization on the regiment's scheme of maneuver and the 502d MI platoons' familiarity with regimental operations. The regiment planned to maneuver with two squadrons abreast during its operation, so we placed one C&J platoon forward in each zone. This gave the regiment on-call jamming, as well as forward deployed ground-based collection. We assigned the TRQ-32(V) team from Det 101 to one of the two C&J platoons to give the company a direction finding (DF) fix capability.

Normally, we deployed the B/511 platoons pure, to avoid complicated reorganization just before combat. We gave these platoons a follow and support mission during movement and deployed them in baselines across the regimental front.

We trained and cleared some Arabic linguists and Kuwaiti soldiers for IEW operations and assigned them to TRQ-32(V) and MLQ-34 teams in both companies. Later, we shifted some of them to the interrogation of prisoners of war (IPW) team to meet mission requirements.

We spread interrogators throughout the regiment. To provide intelligence support forward, we gave a team of an interrogator, a translator, and an MP squad to each squadron. Eight interrogators manned the main EPW cage at the regimental support squadron (RSS). Translators and the remaining two squads of the MP platoon supported them. We could have gotten additional interrogation teams from A/511 and other units, but no one had vehicles to transport them and their gear. This was an area in which current MI unit equipment authorizations didn't support current MI doctrine.

CI teams, augmented with linguists, initially operated from the regimental tactical operations center (TOC), then from the RSS.

Ground surveillance radar (GSR) squads had three GSR teams each. We detached them to individual maneuver squadrons. However, we strictly controlled GSR use after a test revealed that, to friendly aircraft, the radar's signal made it look like a piece of Soviet equipment the Iraqis were using.

Maintenance and Training

Before Ground Day, the task force emphasized maintenance and training, with EW platoon leaders coordinating face-to-face with maneuver squadron staffs. Maintenance was a major challenge, however, especially for attached equipment.

With training, the task force emphasized land navigation and team or platoon drills. All platoons rehearsed extensively before the task force exercises. Our C&J platoons also took part in squadron maneuver exercises, while the B/511 MSQ-103 platoon worked with the field artillery brigade. Task force training came together with the regiment/corps maneuver exercise, which coincided with the move to the forward assembly area (FAA).

Concept of Operations

The task force's concept of operations paralleled the regiment's, with three principal phases: Defensive covering force for the corps forward assembly area (FAA); offensive covering force for a two-division attack into Iraq; and offensive covering force for the massed corps.

In Phase I, we served as the defensive covering force for the corps FAA. It consisted of static collection with two mutually supporting TRQ-32(V) baselines, and an MSQ-103 electronic intelligence baseline, augmented by QUICKFIX missions. All assets operated under control of the 502d MI technical control and analysis element (TCAE). Since there wasn't much enemy signal traffic, the TRQ-32(V) baselines alternated 4-hour schedules, to save wear and tear on the equipment.

Operations security (OPSEC) was very important since the regiment was to lead a surprise flanking attack deep into Iraq. CI personnel apprehended and screened civilians in the FAA and detained possible Iraqi agents or sympathizers. The regiment operated under radio listening silence, so IEW communications were limited to Digital Communication Terminal (AN/PSC-2) links. The TCAE monitored corps TCAE RATT communications, but didn't transmit.

The MSQ-103's operated in direct support of the VII Corps 210th Field Artillery Brigade which augmented the 2d ACR. Their first priority was to identify

and locate enemy counterfire radars. In a nondoctrinal arrangement, the platoon operations center collocated with the 210th FA Brigade TOC. This worked well tactically. Although the enemy didn't activate counterfire radars, the close tie-in of the MSQ-103's to the artillery assured the regiment could respond quickly. This relationship ended when offensive covering force operations began in Phase II.

Each sector's C&J platoon leader coordinated site selections with the squadron staff and served as the task force point of contact to the squadron—a relationship that continued throughout the operation. Having a single point of contact simplified coordination for the squadron and other task force assets as they moved in and out of the squadron sector.

In Phase II, we served as the offensive covering force for a two-division attack into Iraq. At first, C&J platoons moved with their squadrons through the breaches in the border. The 511th TRQ-32(V)'s maintained a baseline and QUICKFIX gave backup coverage. B/511 jammers deployed forward during C&J movement. Once the 502d MI baseline was set on the Iraqi side of the border, B/511 assets moved to a new baseline. We didn't detect any enemy electronic emissions during the breach, nor did we take any prisoners. Once again, we didn't use GSRs.

Once we got through the border, we shifted our focus to rapid movement. We needed to keep IEW assets ready for immediate use when we contacted the enemy. To maintain continuous IEW coverage while ground elements moved, we used QUICKFIX. The C&J platoons advanced with the squadrons in prearranged positions within their tactical formations. We gave B/511 a follow and support mission and moved it with the task force trains 10 to 15 kilometers behind the C&J platoons. We gave B/511 platoons warning orders and committed them based on the tactical situation as the regiment advanced and engaged the enemy. Platoon and team drills were central to this phase's success with automatic, well-rehearsed actions occurring at every halt.

EPWs flooded into the regiment's area. The first prisoners were Iraq's 48th Infantry Division soldiers retreating north from the 1st U.S. ID attack. The numbers rose quickly, fed by Iraq's 25th and 26th IDs, and nearly overwhelmed our limited interrogation and MP assets. Meanwhile, VII Corps took back its guidance which had allowed the regiment to bypass disarmed EPWs. We then pressed cooks, mechanics, and combat soldiers into service as EPW controllers. Interrogators, with their translators, worked around the clock, while the regiment continued its forward movement. By the end of G+1, task force interrogators had processed over 2,000 EPWs.

Enemy communications were extremely limited and all were encrypted. We jammed all communications, even though they were from outside the regimental zone. We used GSRs sparingly and only in a security role. During the night of G+1, GSRs performed extremely well, detecting movement at ranges greater than their doctrinal capabilities. GSRs gave early warning and vectored friendly artillery fires and maneuver engagements against enemy counterattacks.

In Phase III, we served as the offensive covering force for the massed corps. The regiment deployed three squadrons abreast. The IEW task force deployed all C&J assets forward to balance capabilities across the front, to provide command and control in all three zones, and to avoid extended frontages for the B/511 platoons. The bulk of two B Company platoons was deployed in a single zone with the senior platoon leader designated the point of contact to the squadron. This ad hoc arrangement was only marginally effective, but caused no significant problems. For us, however, it did reinforce the argument for a third EW platoon in the ACR's MI company and highlighted the advantages of the C&J structure over "pure" system-based platoons.

We still weren't picking up enemy electronic signals. As the regiment advanced, it traveled through a latticework of wires and cables which crisscrossed the desert between bunkers, taking the place of radios for the enemy's command and control. EPWs confirmed radio communications had been forbidden for at least 2 months. We found many enemy combat vehicles, including tanks, that had no radios.

Apparently, out of regard for allied EW capabilities, the Iraqi army had stopped using its radios and radar systems. Instead, they used an extensive network of wire and cable for communications, and visual observation and deception instead of radars. While this tactic frustrated our EW efforts, it did accomplish our mission to neutralize two thirds of the enemy's command and control. It also freed our linguists to help in the overtaxed interrogation section.

We continued to pick up prisoners in large numbers, now from the Tawakalna (Republican Guards) Division and the 12th and 17th Iraqi Mechanized Divisions. The regiment overran Republican Guards command posts and logistic bases, yielding hundreds of pounds of classified plans, overlays, and documents.

Cease Fire

By the time the cease fire came, on the morning of G+4, task force interrogators had processed over 3,400 EPW and 600 pounds of classified material. EPW interrogation later disclosed the U.S. attack had caught the Iraqi army by surprise. The Tawakalna had hastily shifted to meet the regiment on its flank and had expected contact following the sandstorm on G+3. However, the regiment's attack through the sandstorm confounded the Tawakalna's defense. Our tanks engaged the Iraqis from beyond the range of their sensors, throwing their defense into disarray. At this point, the 2d ACR reached its limit of advance and the corps main body executed a passage of lines, taking over the fight.

As the regiment shifted into reserve and the cease fire took hold, we scaled down our IEW operations. We still weren't getting electronic intercepts and, with friendly units going into base clusters, we didn't need GSR surveillance. Only the interrogators and translators stayed busy processing and forwarding captured enemy documents.

In spite of the complex nature of the operation and the enemy, the IEW task force accomplished its mission. The concept of operations fit both the mission and the available assets and operations proceeded as planned. We consistently had assets at the critical time and place on the battlefield. The IPW teams performed superbly, contributing greatly to the intelligence picture. CI and GSR operations were effective.

Through the battles and the long, demanding cross-country march, the equipment was operational. And, most importantly, there were no combat losses. By every measure, the task force's DESERT STORM operations were a success. However, this experience highlighted areas where we need to make doctrinal and force structure improvements to make the MI company more self supporting. Although we lacked the organic assets to be self-supporting, we created an extremely successful task force. Hopefully, this article will instruct others who must provide IEW support to the Army's ACRs.

Major Daniel F. Baker commands the 502d MI Company, 2d ACR. Previously, as regimental S2, he managed border surveillance operations for over 700 kilometers of the Iron Curtain. Major Baker's previous assignments include ODCSINT, DA and Field Station Sinop, as well as the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, where he served as an instructor, company commander, and aide-de-camp. He's a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and CAS^3.

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

XVIII Airborne Corps Desert *DECEPTION*

By Major Gary P. Melton

The deployment of the XVIII Airborne Corps to DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the deception operations that followed began in August with a genuine sense of *deja vu.* We'd just completed CENTCOM Exercise INTERNAL LOOK and the territory and situation were familiar. However, the similarities ended there. The planning and execution challenges we faced now were 7,500 miles away from Fort Bragg.

We deployed our 12-member deception cell in 3 sections. On August 27, 1990, a six-member planning and administrative element deployed. This cell continued the corps planning cycle we began back at Fort Bragg and put the first deception equipment package on the ground.

Realizing the scope of our operations and the arduous conditions of the area of operations, the deception equipment office at Fort Belvoir loaned us, on very short notice, additional communication emulators and camouflage decoys. Our forward element used these as well. The remaining corps cell soldiers deployed over the next 2 months.

As corps G3 planners developed their possible courses of action, the deception planners developed deception courses of action (DCA) to support them. Once we decided the operational course of action (OCA), we briefed the DCAs for that OCA to the G3 for a decision. Operational and deception planners worked closely together from the start.

This process is critical to the development of a successful deception plan. Unfortunately, too often the process is diluted or disregarded completely, with the deception planner getting involved only at the end. This often results in deception for deception's sake, and a deception plan that doesn't support operational objectives. Fortunately, our corps leadership is now willing to "juggle that extra ball" and to recognize the need for properly planned deception operations as a combat multiplier.

We conducted our first deception operation from October 15 to November 28, 1990, in support of a possible Iraqi offensive. Our operational objectives were to portray our corps establishing a defense in a sector along the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLine) Road. We tried to portray the sparse Pan-Arab forces as the only covering force forward of TAPLine Road, when, in fact, a large U.S. covering force was there. We knew early on that, on the offensive, the Iraqis considered TAPLine Road to be their first 24-hour strategic objective. Therefore, we could make a credible portrayal of the corps establishing a defense at the TAPLine. If believed, this deception would have confused Iraqi command and control when they ran into a formidable U.S. covering force before they expected.

In addition, when the Iraqis didn't find the FEBA at the TAPLine, their command and control would suffer a second setback. The portrayal of the corps FEBA forward of its actual location would expose Iraqi artillery early, provide a degree of force protec-

tion to our command and control, and open up counterfire opportunities against Iraqi artillery.

Initially, we at corps conducted the deception. But after the first week, to enlarge the portrayal, the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 1st Cavalry Division consolidated their people and equipment under the corps.

Three weeks later, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deception cell began complementary operations. Lasting just over 6 weeks, these operations portrayed 101st and 24th brigade level TOCs and forward armor battalions posturing in the defense just south of TAPLine Road. In addition to signal emulations, we used decoy tracked and wheeled vehicles and decoy forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). We used PSYOP teams and real HF RATT traffic in a deception mode. We added many small but important elements, such as unit signs, troop visibility in local towns, and vehicle convoys to enhance the deception's credibility. Additionally, some of the actual covering force units were conducting training that further supported the story that we were establishing a defense along TAPLine Road.

Although the Iraqis never attacked, this first opportunity to plan, coordinate, and conduct deception operations in a desert environment was an invaluable learning experience. The lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD made us much smarter in the way we supported DESERT STORM. Although ultimately, we couldn't test our operations' success because the Iraqi attack never came, we did get indicators that our operations attracted Iraqi HUMINT and SIGINT collection attention.

The key lessons from these initial deception operations are—

- ☐ With proper operator maintenance, both decoy and electronic deception equipment can operate successfully in the desert environment for long periods.
- ☐ To get sufficient resources to portray a believable deception story, corps and division deception cells must be consolidated.

When we returned from DESERT SHIELD, we began to plan those deceptions that would support offensive operations. We developed six different DCAs to support the OCA and its associated objectives. Just 2 weeks before the air war started, the CENTCOM planning staff set up a theater level deception conference and published the first deception guidance of the war. ARCENT quickly followed suit with similar guidance. Significantly, our higher headquarters recognized the importance of their participation in and support of deception. ARCENT and CENTCOM were vital players in coordinating the large scale deception effort needed to support offensive operations.

The CENTCOM plan paralleled our fourth DCA. This made our planning role relatively easy. The deception's objective was to reinforce the Iraqi belief that U.S. forces would attack directly into Kuwait and would not go west of the Wadi Al Batin. The deception story was that the two Army corps would attack into western Kuwait with the Marines coming up the eastern coast.

False amphibious and airborne operations also fed the deception. The intent was to distract Iraqi collection efforts and to help conceal the further westward movement of the two corps. Consequently, the Iraqis would present a weakly defended flank that we could take advantage of on G-Day.

The XVIII Airborne Corps' deception operations were very extensive. They required the consolidated effort of corps and all four division deception cells (including the 82d Airborne Division as well as the divisions previously mentioned). On February 13, 1991, the corps and division cells deployed forward. During the next 5 days we established deception tactical assembly areas (TAAs) south of the western Kuwaiti border. Some 300 people took part in this operation: A signal company, four PSYOP sonic teams, a combat heavy engineer platoon, a smoke/decontamination platoon, and an infantry platoon which provided vital complementary support. The corps G3 helped make the necessary support happen. Day and night convoys, logistic sites, FARPs, air and ground reconnaissance, CPs, TAAs, airborne and air assault demonstrations, and smoke and decontamination training operations all showed a buildup of corps forces, which supported the deception story.

Counterintelligence teams worked local communities to present the deception story to suspected Iraqi HUMINT collectors. PSYOP air operations dropped more than half a million surrender leaflets north of the notional corps sector. Numerous small deceptions such as falsely marked unit signs and route markings became pieces of the misleading puzzle we wanted the Iraqis to solve.

However, the U.S. air campaign now underway was so successful that the number of Iraqi collection assets was rapidly dwindling. Targeting took into account the theater deception plan, but eventually, many systems we wanted to feed no longer existed. Our deception keyed on remaining Iraqi SIGINT collection assets (fixed and mobile) and a credible HUMINT collection asset. Iraqi IMINT was no longer a deception target of opportunity, except possibly what came in from other nations or sources. The

unimpeded movement of two Army corps west of the Wadi Al Batin, and the surprise and success of the ground offensive are the best indicators of our deception operations' success. Additionally, intelligence intercepts indicated the Iraqis were confused right up to G-Day about the true disposition of U.S. ground forces. They believed XVIII Airborne Corps units were still located where the deception was conducted.

Our DESERT STORM Phase II operations reinforced our DESERT SHIELD lessons. For example, we learned that to portray a deception of any size and scope, deception operations must be consolidated. On one hand, tactical level deception is usually planned and developed at division and lower levels. Also, tactical level deception can make best use of operational assets. On the other hand, operational and strategic deception operations require detailed planning, close control, and can best use the more sophisticated decoy and electronic deception equipment.

The weather taught us lessons too. We experienced an unusual amount of rain, and the signal emulators, advertised as being water resistant, did not fare well. In the future, we must make sure that signal emulators are, in fact, waterproof. Also, we would get more flexibility out of air-droppable emulators.

During Phase III (the ground offensive), division deception cells returned to their divisions to conduct tactical deception operations. For Phase III, we got no deception guidance from higher headquarters. The corps opted to execute a deception plan which portrayed a U.S. threat toward Baghdad in the far west vicinity of Ar'Ar, a border town on TAPLine Road. The intent was to fix the Iraqi 54th Infantry Division, which was defending along the main LOC north of Ar'Ar to Baghdad. If we could fix the 54th until G+5, they wouldn't be a threat to the corps left flank. A signal package, a combat heavy engineer platoon, a smoke/decontamination platoon, and two PSYOP sonic teams supplemented the deception element as it conducted Phase III from February 13 to March 1, 1991.

During Phase III, we physically and electronically portrayed an armor brigade TOC. We electronically, and, to a limited extent, physically portrayed a logistic base, a FARP, and two armor battalions. Again, day and night convoys, signs, smoke operations, and PSYOP sonic teams gave credibility to the deception. CI teams supported the deception story through their activities in Ar'Ar. PSYOP surrender leaflet drops north in the 54th Infantry Division area supported the attack to Baghdad scenario. The brigade TOC was located approximately 30 kilometers south of the Iraqi border; but, as 54th elements approached the border, we portrayed an armor battalion moving north to the border just opposite the Iraqi units. We used smoke and signal emulations (both secure and clear) to portray this.

Verification was probably the most difficult aspect of the operation. The reason for this was that U.S. and Iraqi forces were 300 kilometers apart, and collection assets were dedicated to the main corps offensive effort. It was difficult to identify specific indicators that the Iraqis saw and bought the deception story.

Nevertheless, we consider the operation a success because we achieved our main objective—fixing the 54th Infantry Division through G+5. Lessons learned during Phase III were all reflected in the previous phases. An additional challenge during this phase was operating completely independent of U.S. forces. The only friendly forces in our area of operations were Saudi frontier forces and a Pakistani armor brigade.

U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf was unfortunate, but necessary. However, the experience a relatively new Army deception organization gained was invaluable. Although the support we got from our corps was outstanding, we still have a long way to go before deception is recognized Armywide as a combat multiplier and is elevated to its proper place in planning and operations.

Additionally, I believe we need only one deception planner at division level and a larger, better resourced deception element at corps (ideally a deception battalion). This would best support the growing need for operational level deception in the Army of today and the future.

Throughout history, warfare experts such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz contend warfare and deception are inseparable. During this century, Winston Churchill cautioned, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." We haven't always heeded this advice. Modern warfare technology has provided a level of destruction heretofore unimagined. The modern war planner must conceal his forces and capitalize on surprise. The use of deception can no longer be ignored if we seek an acceptable victory!

Major Gary P. Melton was commissioned in 1975 at the U.S. Military Academy. He served company commander tours in both TRADOC and mechanized infantry companies. He served on staff and faculty at the USMA before assuming his current position as Chief, Deception Element, XVIII Airborne Corps. Major Melton is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Command and General Staff College.

PROPONENT NOTES

Language

We are developing a new language MOS (97L) for Reserve Components. The new MOS will help the Army accomplish its translation and interpreter missions by establishing "language" as an MOS skill. To cut down the training time needed to become MOS qualified, recruitment will focus on soldiers with acquired language skills.

Officers

We are also developing a new MIOAC, which will begin in the first quarter FY 92. This course will produce all-source intelligence officers capable of serving in almost every Army MI position. The course, as it's evolving, includes all SIGINT tasks and selected IMINT and HUMINT tasks now being offered in the Area of Concentration (AOC)-producing track courses.

The MI Corps will continue to maintain the AOC system. However, the number of officers requiring AOCs other than "D" will be smaller and assignment specific. The Intelligence Center is undergoing a complete regulatory review. We expect to see these changes published in October 1992 updates.

We're developing new assignment guidance for officers graduating from the new MIOAC, so MI Branch can properly assign them. We expect the new MIOAC will better prepare MI officers to perform a wide variety of missions in support of war fighters.

Warrant Officers

The Commandant of the Defense Intelligence Center (DIC) has obtained approval to offer a Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence (BSI), starting in FY 93. The DIC has authorized 160 Army military and civilian personnel to attend each fiscal year. The MI proponent supports this program and we're coordinating with PERSCOM to allow more Army MI personnel to attend. The OCMI is looking at the BSI as a retention incentive for the MI Warrant Officer Program.

Enlisted

As a result of the General Officer Steering Committee session held last June, we're expanding MOS 97G (Counter-SIGINT) to include multidiscipline counterintelligence activities. The expanded MOS, retitled Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Operator/Analyst, will improve our capability to determine all hostile threats, friendly vulnerabilities, and effective countermeasures needed to protect the force.

DA has approved a new age entry requirement for MOS 97B (CI Agent). As of June, the change requires all entry-level soldiers to be at least 19 and a half years old before enlisting for the MOS.

The BSI referred to in warrant officer notes above, also applies to enlisted soldiers. To be eligible, soldiers must be serving as a staff sergeant or above in CMFs 96 and 98; and they must have an associate's degree plus at least 20 additional academic hours. PERSCOM will send a message to the field explaining admission criteria and retention requirements.

The Army will begin using the new Self Development Test (SDT) for Active Component soldiers in FY 92 and Reserve Component soldiers in FY 93. The test objective is to allow NCOs to measure and guide their growth in skills and proficiencies they need as they continue to develop as leaders. Every sergeant through sergeant first class will take an SDT, which consists of three sections:

Leadership: 20 questions from FM 22-100, FM 22-101, and FM 22-102, developed by the Center for Army Leadership.

Training: 20 questions from FM 25-101, developed by the Sergeants Major Academy.

MOS Knowledge: 60 questions (depending on the MOS) from the Soldier's Manual and associated references listed in the SDT Notice, developed by proponent schools.

The 100 question, multiple-choice test requires individual rather than unit preparation. Soldiers in CMF 98 need SCIF access to study for the test. The test will be more broad-based and require more general MOS knowledge than the SQT did. FY 92 and FY 93 test results won't be used for personnel management purposes, but for self development only. The individual soldier's report will reflect a raw score and a percentile ranking. In the third year, we'll use data from FY 92 and 93 to set a passing score.

The SDT differs greatly from the SQT for MOSs 98D, 98G, 98H, and 98K, in that it won't evaluate language or Morse code copy proficiency. Magnetic

tapes and audio materials won't be used as part of the SDT. The SDT will consist of the test booklet, additional supplement booklets and test materials, if needed, and a mark sense form to record the answers.

To give soldiers enough time to get training and leadership publications and to prepare for the SDT, the SDT window for first quarter (Oct/Nov/Dec) is extended to March. The SDT test windows are shown below.

Civilians

DA has approved five Army Occupational Guides (AOGs) and released them to the field for implementation. They are: 1700 Series (Education and Training), Intelligence Operations, Intelligence Production, Security Administration, and Scientific and Technical Intelligence (multiseries) in Intelligence Production. Two additional AOGs are under development: Intelligence and Threat Support and Intelligence Combat Development.

MOS	ACTIVE ARMY FY 92	RESERVE COMPONENT FY 93
98C	Oct-Mar (6 Months)	Oct-Sep
98J	Oct-Mar (6 Months)	Oct-Sep
96B	Jan-Mar	Jan-Dec
98D	Feb-Apr	Feb-Jan
98H	Feb-Apr	Feb-Jan
98K	Feb-Apr	Feb-Jan
98G	May-Jul	May-Apr
97E	May-Jul	May-Apr
97B	Jun-Aug	Jun-May
96D	Jul-Sep	Jul-Jun
33CMF	Aug-Oct	Aug-Jul
96R	Aug-Oct	Aug-Jul

TOTAL FORCE

By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

Army Superior Unit Award

The 6th Army ITAAS recently received the Superior Unit Award for outstanding meritorious performance during DESERT STORM. DA recognized this Reserve Forces intelligence school for "Effectively integrating its unit soldiers into the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca...and developing new programs of instruction and providing instruction of the highest quality...."

This significant event brings tremendous credit

and potential for all our sister Reserve intelligence schools. It is abundantly clear that during mobilization—even during periods of partial mobilization—the Intelligence Center needs Reserve augmentation.

During DESERT STORM, not only was the 6th Army ITAAS mobilized but also elements from the other four Reserve intelligence schools. In addition, DA activated Ready Reserve MI instructors to train soldiers deploying to Southwest Asia. So even though the 6th received the award, all MI Ready Reserve soldiers deserve a resounding "thanks" for support to the Total Force.

ITAAS Transition IPR

The Intelligence Center and the FORSCOM J2 will jointly host an In-Progress Review at Fort Huachuca on October 31 and November 1. The Intelligence Center is pleased with our relationship with the ITAAS community; but, as a result of lessons learned during DESERT STORM and with the force drawdown, we need closer ties between AC and RC MI schools. In particular, we'll address these issues:

- ☐ The transition to Reserve Forces intelligence schools.
- ☐ Requirements for an MI officer transition course.
- ☐ A revised and shortened MIOAC.
- ☐ The scenarios for ITAAS mobilization to Fort Huachuca.
- ☐ The impact of Devens closure on 1st Army ITAAS.
- ☐ An expanded relationship with the Army Guard.

The bottom line is the MI Proponent needs to be in sync with the intelligence Reserve schools, both in the peacetime teaching of RC soldiers and during mobilization when the Intelligence Center requires augmentation. If you're interested in any of these issues but can not attend, please contact me with your concerns. We look forward to a productive session and will report our findings and recommendations in the next column.

Dialogue

Thank you for your positive feedback from these articles. Telephone calls, letters, and increased subscriptions to **MI Professional Bulletin** have been coming in. The dialogue that continues from these articles is most constructive, especially, on the proposal to have a Reserve Forces intelligence school-Huachuca as the focal point for the entire ITAAS system. We welcome your input, especially through our branch journal. Please keep the letters to the editor and feedback to me coming, so we can maintain an informed MI Total Force.

MI Technical Chain

With the recent establishment of the Army Reserve Command headquartered at Fort McPherson, GA, the ARCOMs or 2-star Reserve regional commands have significantly more clout in the command and control of Reserve units. Therefore, the MI technical chain is more important than ever. MI is not stove-piped as a separate command, so the MI community must be familiar with and efficiently use the new Reserve management structure. My office is responsible for input to REDTRAIN, MI billet structure, security and combating terrorism issues, and most importantly, funding issues. To this end, we've developed an MI responsible office, to include full and part time action officers with telephone numbers at each ARCOM. For a copy of the phone list, please write me.

MI Relook: What We Did Last Summer

As the Army drawdown continues, MI is looking inward to validate its requirements, to restructure based on AirLand Operations requirements, and to ensure that it remain a viable force in the Army.

MI is also analyzing the Reserve Component structure. During this process, our work so far shows significant resiliency and solid ability for the MI RC force not only in our units but, especially, for individual soldiers. Our goal is to structure and prioritize an MI RC force that's viable in both peace and war.

As an example, we're looking to civilian acquired skills, especially in the language arena. If language is detached from signals and interrogation specialty training, our readiness will skyrocket and essentially reflect reality. We have now, and we can recruit, citizen soldiers who are fluent in a language. Matching these soldiers to a language dependent MOS makes sense, since that's what would happen during war. In addition, placing low profile languages such as Vietnamese, Thai, or Tagalog in RC units is cost effective.

We're considering other proposals including establishing single discipline RC units for improved training, and developing augmentation packages for contingencies from recently trained (RT 12-24) Ready Reserve soldiers. In the next column, I'll detail more of these innovative solutions for a ready MI RC force.

Colonel Joe Mesch is the Reserve Forces Advisor to the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. His phone numbers are: DSN 821-1176; commercial (602) 533-1176; home (602) 459-6893. Write him at ATTN: ATSI-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 2)*

need to have it, in the format they can use, synchronized to the commander's concept of the operation. Our new MI officer basic and advanced courses will teach them to do this.

Finally, we can help persuade combat arms commanders to become active participants in the intelligence process. There are three critical ways commanders can do this:

- ☐ Participate actively in defining specific and realistic requirements.
- ☐ Create an environment which encourages and trains their S2s to make the tough calls and to predict what course of action the enemy will pursue.
- ☐ Motivate their staffs and, in particular, their S3s to develop and use decision support templates to verify whether or not the calls are correct, so that if they're not, they can compensate in time.

We intend to seek combat arms commanders' involvement in the intelligence process at their precommand course training at branch schools and Fort Leavenworth. If we diligently work to provide commanders tailored intelligence products focused on and synchronized with their operational concept, we will be driven to manage collection, production, and time much more effectively. Success will require total focus on the commander's requirements and the time in which they must be satisfied.

Many of you will say we're already doing that; if so, keep trucking and provide us feedback on the procedures or tools that make you successful, so we can pass them on to others.

If you feel you're not quite as successful as you'd like, there is help on the way. We're now training officers in the basic and advanced course to use a synchronization matrix similar to that developed by the ARCENT G2 staff during DESERT STORM. This matrix served as a tool to synchronize intelligence collection and production to the commander's concept of operations. That matrix is described in Colonel John Black's article in this issue. We're also writing a white paper on the synchronization matrix and its use in DESERT STORM. It will be published by October 15 and distributed to all G2s for further dissemination to S2s.

Another factor we have to deal with if we're to support commanders properly is targeting. Commanders' priority requirements should include targets, as well as intelligence on the enemy. The commander should specify what targets or types of targets he wants located and attacked in priority and, if appropriate, specify timelines for their attack. Whether his intent is to shape the battlefield, deny the enemy full use of his fire support, or some other target set, the commander must specify or the "2" must elicit the commander's targeting priorities.

We must orchestrate collection to satisfy both intelligence and targeting requirements within the commander's timelines in the most efficient and synergistic manner possible. We may need a concurrent requirement for battle damage assessment to determine the results of the targeting effort, which would put even greater demands on collection resources and efficient collection management.

Fortunately, as Lieutenant General Eichelberger points out in his article, we're about to field several new systems which will provide targeting accuracies by themselves, and we'll no longer have to go through the time consuming analytical process of combining the results of multiple sensors with IPB to get accuracies sufficiently precise to target.

Targeting accuracies are inherent in Joint STARS, UAVs, GUARDRAIL Common Sensor, and several other systems we will field in the next few years. We must change the way we do business to capitalize on them. Instead of passing potential targets to analysts to try to get improved accuracies, we can and must pass targets directly to the fire support element or directly to the shooters by quick-fire channels from the collector.

A focus on timely delivery of priority targets, as well as intelligence, is vital if we're going to demonstrate to commanders that we're committed to supporting them properly. I know we can do it and in many units, if not most, we're doing it already. With improved assignment policies, focused training, and new, more capable systems, all of which are a reality now or soon will be, there is **no doubt** that we will do it better than ever before. With your help we will win this challenge and demonstrate clearly that our creed, "Intelligence is for commanders," is not empty rhetoric, but a way of life, and a *raison d'etre* for the MI Corps. If we do this together, we'll be in position to fully realize the bright future that Lieutenant General Eichelberger sees for our branch.

CAREER NOTES

There are some new faces at MI Branch! Currently, your career managers are Lieutenant Colonel William T. Torpey, MI Branch Chief; Major John DeFreitas, lieutenant colonel assignments officer; Major Foster Payne, major assignments officer; Captain Chris Munn, captain assignments officer; Captain Ed Clark, lieutenant assignments officer; and Captain Mary Legere, professional development officer. You can reach them at AV 221-0143 or Commercial (202) 325-0143 for company grade assignments, and AV 221-0145 or Commercial (202)325-0145 for field grade assignments.

A note to remind officers who will go before promotion or school selection boards next year: Make sure your records brief, official photo, and microfiche are current.

MI Program Update

The following are application deadlines for selection boards to be held the first quarter of FY 93: Post Graduate Intelligence Program, September 15, 1992; Junior Officer Career Cryptologic Program, October 10; Advanced Civil Schooling, October 10; and Director, National Security Agency Fellowship, November 15.

Expect to see messages announcing these boards, their eligibility criteria, and their application processes in the second quarter of FY 92. Next year, PGIP will be available to promotable first lieutenants, captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. We have limited social science quotas for ACS. Call Branch for more information on these boards.

Functional area designation for year group '86 ends this month. The results will come out within the next 90 days. DA will mail out functional area designation packets for year group '87 in June, 1992.

The Intelligence Center is revising schedules for MIOTC and MIOAC. Branch will release a current or revised FY 92 schedule to the field when available. Officers already on orders to MIOTC or MIOAC in FY 92 are still to report on the dates shown on their RFOs. Fort Huachuca is reworking class slates to accommodate all inbound officers. For more information on these classes, call Branch.

The Army has changed the voluntary indefinite process for other than Regular Army (OTRA) officers. The two-step conditional voluntary indefinite/voluntary indefinite (CVI/VI) process is now a single-step process for all Army competitive category (ACC) OTRA officers. The new policy deletes CVI and grants VI at the point where CVI was previously awarded. Officers who accept VI will continue on active duty in a VI status until selection to major and integration into the Regular Army, unless they're separated before then.

These are the new policy's key changes:

- ☐ All ACC OTRA officers in year group '83 who haven't yet applied for VI must do so now.
- ☐ All ACC commissioned officers in year groups '84 through '87 who were selected for and accepted CVI will automatically be switched to VI. PERSCOM will update officer military personnel files to reflect this.
- ☐ Beginning with year group '88, the lieutenant retention board will automatically consider all ACC OTRA officers for VI. There's no need to apply for consideration.

Officers accepted for VI will continue to accept or decline VI status by using the form memorandum supplied with the board results. Those officers who accept VI will incur a 1-year active duty service obligation which begins the day after they complete their initial obligation.

MI officers interested in assignment with Special Forces may now apply for the Special Forces Qualification (Q) Course. Applicants for the 22-week course must agree to accept a follow-on assignment to a Special Forces unit. To apply, send a DA Form 4187 to MI Branch stating that you want to attend the course and that you understand you'll be sent to a follow-on Special Forces assignment. Candidates for the Q Course go TDY to attend a 3-week assessment course first. If determined suitable for the Q Course, they PCS to Fort Bragg for the Q Course. Follow-on assignments are worked upon graduation. For more information, call MI Branch, or write MI Branch, ATTN: MI professional development officer.

For an update on these items, or for the latest assignments information, call the MI Branch tape at AV 221-0144 or Commercial (703) 325-0144.

TRAINING NOTES

SO, YOU WANT TO BE A C.I. AGENT?

By Major Regan K. Smith, USAR

It's a rare counterintelligence (CI) field office or Army recruiting station that hasn't had to deal with an enthusiastic CI applicant who wants to become James Bond. I've seen how disappointed the applicants are when they discover that CI is not quite what they thought.

So what is the truth? What **is** a CI agent? Ian Fleming and other novelists, not to mention Hollywood and the news media, have so romanticized, or slandered, the "spy world" that it's nearly impossible to find facts in open sources. Certainly, you can't find the kind of information that will help you decide if you really want to be in Army CI.

What Is CI, Anyway?

To make an educated decision on whether or not to apply for a CI specialty, you need to know what CI is. All the dry words in personnel regulations aside, Army CI is more than catching spies. It's more than providing subversion and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) briefings, much more than CI special agents. This article is about CI agents, because that area traditionally generates the most questions.

CI includes counter-signals intelligence specialists, analysts, electronic wizards, computer specialists, and polygraphers. The CI mission is to—

- ☐ Look at the Army through the eyes of an adversary, figure out our weaknesses, and recommend countermeasures.
- ☐ Cause the enemy to doubt the truth of his own intelligence analysis.
- ☐ Stop or negate the effects of his intelligence collection.

We have to think like the other guy if we're going to do this mission right. That means CI personnel have to be smart—or at least know who to ask—not only about foreign intelligence services, but also about foreign and friendly order of battle.

Not everyone is cut out to do this work, so we use an application program to screen for the gold nuggets. The program applies to all applicants—officer, enlisted, and civilian. It begins with an interview by a crusty, experienced CI agent, whose recommendation is key to whether or not PERSCOM or ARPERCEN approves entry into the CI program. Applicants are our future, so we take this part of the program very seriously. Here's how I screen folks.

Dispelling the Myths

Over the years, I've found that many applicants have fallen for the spy myths. If they don't walk out after I dispel the myths, we get serious.

MYTH: CI agents always wear civilian clothes.

FACT: The XVIII Airborne Corps (not to mention the Air Force) frowns on people jumping out of airplanes in three-piece suits. Not every CI assignment requires civilian clothes. Let's face it, we're not civilians or the CIA or the FBI.

MYTH: I won't have to go to the field.

FACT: Get used to muddy boots. You're a soldier first, then a CI specialist. When your unit goes to the field, so do you.

MYTH: I can wear a beard and long hair.

FACT: This ain't the sixties. Even when the duty uniform is civilian clothes, CI personnel meet Army grooming standards. Very rarely does a situation require relaxed grooming standards. One exception: Whether or not women in civvies can wear long hair down is up to the commander (pun intended).

MYTH: I can run around with a badge and do what I like.

FACT: Army intelligence issues badges and credentials ("Bs&Cs") only to people actually involved in CI investigations, such as CI special operations. If you're the installation security manager, a

combat battalion S2, a MACOM staff officer, or a CI policy developer at HQDA, you don't carry Bs&Cs. Bs&Cs are not a status symbol to make you feel important, or to check on your ex-spouse. Misuse of Bs&Cs is a fast way out of CI—and the Army.

MYTH: I want to do what James Bond does.

FACT: Go to Hollywood!

If the applicant is still interested, my next set of questions should dispel any lingering thoughts that CI is a free-wheeling, exotic life of derring-do.

- ☐ Do you like to write? We don't even start an investigation or operation without a written plan. And then, everything we do requires a report. Some of those are informal, internal reports, while others become exhibits in a court, and there are all manners of in-between reports. That means attention to good writing standards (remember grammar classes?) and answering who, what, when, where, why, and how **every time**. Your job isn't done until you've compieted the paperwork properly.
- ☐ Do you like to read? CI agents must keep up on worldwide political and military situations, legislative developments, changing policy and doctrine, technological innovations, arms limitation talks, threat assessments—the list goes on and on. A good agent is tuned into everything around him, and reading voraciously is one of the most effective ways to do this. Agents also review records of all kinds: Personnel, financial, police, other investigations. Since this is a vital part of the job, I recommend a speed-reading course.
- ☐ Do you like dealing with people? If you are basically a hermit, you will be of no use to us. We need introverts and extroverts, but both have to be comfortable dealing with people—lots of people, every day. You have to be able to suspend your own beliefs and prejudices and deal with each person objectively, and that's not easy to do. Most importantly, you must be a good listener and observer. What someone says is not always as important as **how** he says it and what his body language is saying.
- ☐ Do you want to work "regular" hours? If you do, don't apply. The James Hall espionage investigation ruined Christmas for a lot of agents. The job begins when it begins, and it ends only when the last report is filed. Military and civilian CI agents routinely work long hours, weekends, and holidays. Training, maintenance, field duty, and duty officer requirements compete for your time, but you still have to get your agent work done.
- ☐ Do you want high visibility? If you just can't give up "I was there" embroidered jackets and bragging rights, we don't want you. Good CI agents try very hard to blend in wherever they are. That means studying the local language and culture (yep, some of us are linguists), and wearing clothes appropriate to the region—both overseas and in the U.S. It requires that you absolutely never advertise: CI is low visibility. We want to go in quietly, get the job done, and get out quietly without interrupting the routine of the supported unit—and we don't talk about it.

Still interested? Let's talk about the training and duties of a CI agent.

Major Study Areas

- ☐ Interview and investigative techniques. Here's where you'll pick up confidence in asking questions, observing, and analyzing what you gather. You'll also learn how to listen—a technique that's harder to use than you think.
- ☐ Report writing. There are lots of reports. You'll come to love your typewriter or computer keyboard. Can't type? Learn.
- ☐ Legal principles. You'll learn to eat, sleep, and breathe these. Not only must it be operationally smart, it's gotta be legal.
- ☐ Surveillance and interrogation techniques. More on observation (without being observed), how to "read" people, and how to get someone to tell you what you want to know.
- ☐ Foreign intelligence and security services. If you don't know who you're up against, you won't be much good at countering them.
- ☐ Offensive CI operations. We don't just sit and wait for a report that there's a spy out there. We try to close the barn door **before** the horse gets out.
- ☐ CI support to force protection. A catch-all phrase for CI support to a lot of different programs, from combating terrorism to operations security to research and development.
- ☐ Information systems security. Now we're getting technical. You computer wizards would love it. Computer espionage may be the wave of the future.
- ☐ Low intensity conflict. CI and human intelligence are the biggies in intelligence support here: Low-tech, foot-slogging people work, instead of megabuck, geewhiz systems.

There are a lot of other subjects, but you get the idea.

After training, you can be assigned anywhere, from a division to DA or joint level. You could be on

a battalion or higher staff, in a CI company's training or operations section, or in a CI analysis section, or you could be a special agent anywhere we assign special agents—all sorts of places. How does Kwajalein Atoll sound?

You'll start off on probation, sort of like a rookie policeman, for a minimum of 1 year. Only when a CI commander formally certifies you're "good to go" in all areas will you be off probation and fully accepted in the CI program (yes, this includes CI officers, enlisted, and civilians).

However, don't ever think you're "home free." We watch everyone in CI closely. Mess up and you're out, and out can mean anything from removal from the CI program to prison, depending on what you did. We do allow for reasonable human error as you grow and mature in CI. But you have to remember what we do affects other people's careers, reputations, and sometimes their lives. We can not afford to have people in the program who are less than sterling in their own personal conduct and professionalism.

If this hasn't put you off, maybe CI is what you'd like to do after all. After a few years, you can branch out into technical surveillance countermeasures (or "bug hunting" for you electronics fanatics), CI polygraph, or several other niches that you'll learn about once you've been in the field a while. At any rate, if you're really serious, contact the nearest CI office or Army recruiter and ask to apply. You may be just what we're looking for.

Major Regan K. Smith, USAR, is the chief of the CI Controlled Activities Team, HQDA. A Command and General Staff College graduate, she has had assignments at division, corps, EAC, and MACOM level. Major Smith is a graduate of West Texas State University and is completing a master's degree on Strategic Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence College. She authored **AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program.**

THE LIAISON OFFICER: Just a Messenger?

By Captain Frederic P. Filbert

The battalion commander looked at the map board and asked, "S3, where are the overlays for the next mission?" "Sir, the LNO's not back from brigade yet." "Grab him as soon as he gets back; we need the latest poop!" "Roger, sir."

In one way or another, the above scenario routinely took place in my battalion during rotations and exercises. While my experience was in a combat arms unit, MI officers often perform liaison duties to support IEW operations. The MI mission may be different, but the basics of liaison are always the same.

MI officers must know the basics of liaison, because liaison is an implied task in providing support to combat commanders. In MI, the IEWSE must perform liaison tasks as part of his support mission. Additionally, MI units sometimes send out-of-hide liaison officers (LNOs) to maneuver units to act as "ambassadors." Unlike IEWSEs, LNOs work with all members of the supported unit's staff, and not just primarily with the S2/G2. In DESERT STORM, MI units that used out-of-hide LNOs often found the LNOs were crucial to operational success.

At first glance, the LNO seems to be nothing more than a messenger, someone who carries overlays, reports, and operational plans between unit TOCs. This is only part of what the LNO does. In addition to

being a courier, the LNO represents his commander at higher headquarters through personal contact.[1]

The LNO must keep track of his unit's effective combat strength and status. He must be able to brief the supported commander or chief of staff on his unit's individual locations and his commander's intent. He must understand his unit's mission, assets, and operations, and convey his unit's capabilities to the supported commander. To move his information, the LNO must be able to find the TOCs, logistic centers, and other key locations of the supported units. To conduct necessary coordination, he must know the locations of units his unit is attached to, subordinate to, or next to.

The LNO has specific duties he must do before he leaves each unit, visits a higher unit, and returns to his own unit.[2] He must coordinate with other unit LNOs, check his box at higher headquarters, and pass information from the unit to the people who need it. Communications are an important part of the LNO's job.

As his commander's representative, the LNO not only attends higher unit briefings, but he may have to brief those commanders on what his unit is doing or will be doing. This means the LNO must know his commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. The LNO must understand his own unit's capabilities and limitations; he must weigh what he says, because saying the wrong thing could lead to wrong decisions.

Types of LNOs

There are three LNO positions in a division staff structure. The air liaison officer,[3] usually an Air Force officer, advises the G3/S3 on the capabilities and limitations of aircraft that support the division on traditional missions like close air support, suppression of enemy air defense missions, reconnaissance, and airlift. Additionally, he works liaison with air defense artillery personnel and supervises the tactical air command post.

The Naval gunfire liaison officer is usually a Navy or Marine officer.[4] He works with the G3/S3 to coordinate ships and naval gunfire involved in joint operations with Army units. He also assists the fire support team chief as an indirect forward observer in the absence of a spotter.

The LNO, an Army officer from the lower unit battalions, works directly for the chief of staff/G3/S3. He's the commander's representative at higher headquarters. Beyond that, many units, to include MI units, create unofficial LNO positions to better coordinate their operations.

To fight a combined battle in joint operations, U.S. and allied units must maintain close coordination. In effect, without a combined effort in all operations, the battle could be lost. All types of units must conduct liaison in a joint environment.

The LNO represents his commander, but he must also represent other commanders. For example, if a U.S. tank battalion is attached to a German panzer unit, the LNO must represent the German commander to his battalion commander as well.[5] He becomes his commander's representative and the allied commander's representative. He must know his commander's intent, and that of the allied unit commander as well.

To accomplish his mission, the LNO has certain equipment needs, depending on his unit, location, and mission. A tank battalion LNO in Europe may have different equipment needs than an MI LNO at Fort Bragg. Their basic needs, however, will probably be quite similar. The following is a basic equipment list a unit LNO and driver use.

Equiment List

Communications: VRC series radio with Vinson, an auxiliary receiver, and a CEOI with extracts.

Vehicle: M998 (HMMWV) with a camouflage net.

Class I: Two boxes of MREs and a 5-gallon plastic water can.

Class III: Two 5-gallon fuel cans (metal).

Class V: Fifty pistol rounds, two red smoke grenades, 480 M16 rounds, five white smoke grenades, and five fragmentation grenades.

Weapons: One pistol, two M16 rifles, and one M203 grenade launcher.

Other: A roll of acetate, call-sign board, TA 312 field telephone with extra batteries and wire, decontamination equipment, alcohol pens, graphics, templates, a protractor, a compass, and a map.

Mobility is a key factor for the LNO. Without his vehicle he is ineffective. Once in the field, the LNO must have a dedicated vehicle.

The communications system in the LNO vehicle must have a Vinson if it is a VRC series radio. Most TOCs operate in a coded, or green, radio net. When the TOC jumps, an LNO with an uncoded, or red net, is left behind. The LNO also needs the push-button aspect of the VRC 12 so he can store and switch to battalion and brigade level nets, and other nets, as fast as possible. The auxiliary receiver allows him to monitor a different net, for example, MI battalion operations, while he is on the supported brigade net.

With the TA 312 he can hook into phone drops on major training areas to decrease radio traffic. Overseas, the LNO must carry local coins for the off post telephone system. Using the local phone system can

be a combat multiplier. Less radio traffic makes the LNO that much less vulnerable to enemy targeting.

Clean and neat graphics are a must to convey operational information between units. The LNO needs to be on the distribution list for all graphics and operations orders. If he's not, he won't know where friendly obstacles, POL, or the TOC will be in the future.

The LNO must be a "jack of all trades," especially when it comes to receiving Classes I and III equipment. The LNO may work for his support unit, but he must be able to get supplies from his own unit as well. In one instance, I couldn't get Class III equipment from brigade or my battalion and ended up getting fuel from the enemy. I simply drove into their trains, asked for fuel, and received a full tank. This is an extreme example, but versatility is key to the LNO's mission.

On the Class V list, I've included smoke and fragmentation grenades as protection for the LNO, his driver, and their vehicle. With little offensive capability, other than two rifles and a .45 caliber pistol, the LNO needs as much protection as possible. If the LNO, or his driver, is killed or captured, parts of the mission could be compromised. Also, they'd have to be replaced. Many units are short of people and replacing someone would be a strain. Each unit must develop an SOP for LNO personnel and vehicle replacement.

The last point I would like to address is the LNO's driver. The LNO has no set schedule and is basically on call 24 hours a day. This can put a considerable strain on the driver. A tired driver is a hazard to himself, the LNO, and anyone else on the road. Standing orders for the driver must be to park the vehicle in a concealed position and immediately go to sleep. This gives the LNO an alert driver who can navigate if the LNO has to work long hours.

What I have covered is, by no means, a complete picture of what the LNO does. What I hope to do is show that the LNO is not just a messenger and has many duties to perform, as dictated by each mission. Being versatile, using ingenuity, and improvising, as well as having good tactical sense, will aid the LNO in his mission.

End Notes

1. **Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations**, (May 1984), p. 2-5.
2. Ibid, pp. 3-28 thru 3-29.
3. Ibid, p. 3-19.
4. Ibid, p. 3-29.
5. Ronald M. Schrock, "Interoperability in NATO," **Armor**, September-October 1984, p. 19.

Captain Filbert graduated from the University of Hawaii in 1986 and received a commission in Armor. He has served as a tank platoon leader with 2-37 Armor/1st ID(F) in the FRG, and then as battalion liaison officer, 3-34 Armor/1st ID(F). After completing MIOTC and OAC, he was assigned to 1st Brigade, 1st ID(M) and deployed to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM as the brigade assistant S2, the position he now holds.

VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 3)*

- ☐ We still need to work on the bullets supporting a rating of excellence.
- ☐ The NCO-ER gives an accurate picture of the soldier if the rater and senior rater do what they're supposed to do.
- ☐ It's important that the NCO-ER reflect discipline problems which occurred during the rating period.
- ☐ Senior raters must stress potential. Promotion boards rely on the senior rater's comments.

We have got to continue to educate our NCOs, officers, and civilians on their responsibility to counsel the rated NCO. Counseling helps to map out standards for success and excellence. We owe our NCOs the counseling sessions; this is the only way they'll know what the rater expects of them. Putting off counseling leaves the rater in a real fix at rating time.

Raters are not using the "Duty Description" block as effectively as they could. We must keep in mind this block should tell DA boards a great deal about the NCO's duties. It's important to develop an accurate and meaningful duty description. Again, raters should stress numbers supervised, types of equipment responsible for, and dollar amount accountable for.

As our NCOs move up in rank, ratings will begin to take the form of measured performance of subordinates. The performance of subordinates is a direct link to the types of training, guidance, and leadership they have received. Performance of subordinates can translate into standards of "needs improvement," "success," and "excellence." Raters should keep this in mind when rating senior NCOs.

The last word on the NCO-ER is that it's doing well and DA selection boards are selecting success.

Keep up the good work.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Yamamoto, The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor by Edwin P. Hoyt (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 271 pages, $19.95.

The author is well known for his previous treatment of World War II in **Carrier Wars**, **The GI's War**, and **Japan's War**. Hoyt's books are interesting and readable, as is this latest, a sympathetic examination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the prominent Japanese naval strategist.

Hoyt highlights Yamamoto's career, but also adds lesser-known details about his life. Recognized from his cadet days as having a first-rate mind, Yamamoto rose through the naval ranks, becoming a captain at 39. He recognized air power as a future weapon and learned to fly that same year, matching the career of his American naval nemesis of World War II, Admiral William "Bull" Halsey.

Known as a strict disciplinarian and an efficient fleet commander, Yamamoto was not a "party man." He disagreed strongly with Japan's shift to anti-Americanism in the 1920's and 30's. His service as a naval attache in America convinced him that in a war with America, Japan would lose because of America's production capacity. He was also fond of Americans. The tragedy of his life was that his career led him to plan a masterpiece attack against a country he liked and admired.

This book's value is in the little known details surrounding the Japanese military hierarchy and their prosecution of the war during its first days. For instance, although Admiral Yamamoto's plan of attack for Pearl Harbor was initially executed well by his subordinate, Admiral Nagumo, the author states, "Admiral Nagumo had turned away from Pearl Harbor without finishing the job....His failure to knock out the American aircraft carriers and destroy the submarines rankled (Yamamoto) very badly....Yamamoto knew he had lost his gambit because of the timidity of a subordinate...."

The book also reveals the role of a Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji, a "trouble shooter" from the Imperial General Staff. He went to the Philippines and Guadalcanal to counsel army leaders to increase their harsh treatment of captured enemy soldiers to show "the white man's inferiority." Tsuji charged General Homma, the man eventually hanged for the Bataan Death March, with being "soft" because he was humane to enemy prisoners before Tsuji's arrival! Yamamoto wrote letters to the imperial general staff objecting to this "new Bushido Code" as an affront to the traditional Samurai Code. Because of such protests, he thought he might be relieved a number of times!

Yamamoto was also known to counsel his admirals and ship captains not to commit ritual suicide in defeat, as much for his abhorrence of the "new code" as well as his need for experienced men. He never was removed, however, because even his most rabid enemies knew he couldn't be replaced, a fact evident in the decline of Japanese naval fortunes after his death in 1943.

Finally, Hoyt examines the military operation that actually "assassinated" Yamamoto in the skies above Rabaul, an operation approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Controversy still surrounds this move, as much for its political implications as for what it reveals about the efforts that led to our breaking the Japanese cipher code during the war.

This is an enjoyable, on-track book that would add to any reader's library.

Captain Rick Ugino, ARNG
Rochester, NY

The Lessons of Modern War, Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 394 pages, $47.50; **Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War**, 647 pages, $54.95; and **Volume III: The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts**, 471 pages, $49.95 by Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

Every intelligence professional should be aware of this set's existence. Together, these books are an exhaustive, sophisticated attempt to draw lessons on combined arms, tactics, and technology from five recent wars. More importantly, they provide a first-rate reference on the use and effects of current weapon systems and technology in wars involving Third World nations. Recognizing the shift in focus

toward the Third World, Cordesman and Wagner concentrate on lessons in five recent conflicts.

The authors have standardized their coverage of each war. They describe the opposing forces, give a short history of the conflict, and analyze 23 categories of systems, tactics, and forces. These categories include a wide range of weapon systems, combined arms, command and control, and threat assessment technologies.

The authors aren't afraid to get into the nuts and bolts of techniques and systems. Focusing on the lessons in these categories, however, they give only enough political background needed to understand the military conflict. They also avoid detailed descriptions of battles. The result is an informed, albeit narrow, look at the five wars.

At the end of the third volume, Cordesman and Wagner draw their conclusions and overall lessons learned. Although all the conclusions are interesting, most useful are those concerning threat assessment technologies. The authors conclude that much Western intelligence technology, especially SIGINT and IMINT, have limited value in low-level wars. And while HUMINT is potentially more useful, it's often limited by policy guidance.

However, the conclusions aren't this set's greatest value—the authors, themselves, aren't dogmatic about their lessons. What makes this book indispensable for the intelligence analyst is its information. Using an impressive array of sources, the authors have collected a wealth of information on the use and impact of modern weapon systems and techniques. With over 150 charts and figures, the encyclopedia format and great detail make this book a reference you'll use over and over.

The Lessons of Modern War does have its limitations, though. It tightly focuses on technology and armaments. The authors admit they avoided dealing with the more subjective issues of war. As a result, leadership, morale, training, and other human elements aren't covered with the vigor that weapons are.

Still, this set is an extremely useful examination of modern weapons and technologies and their effects.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome by Carlo D'Este (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 1991), 566 pages, $35.00.

Over the past 8 years, Carlo D'Este has produced a string of outstanding operational histories on World War II campaigns. **Fatal Decision** is no exception. Insightful and highly readable, this book captures the Anzio campaign's bitter fighting and frustrations. More than simply a good campaign history, it offers a case study in the dangers of prestige grabbing and faulty planning in military operations. Without hesitation, I recommend this book.

D'Este gives a well-balanced examination of the Anzio campaign of January-May 1944, covering both German and Allied perspectives. He begins with a superb overview of Allied Mediterranean operations up to the stalemate in Italy. After placing the campaign in its strategic context, he continually weaves the Anzio battles into the broader picture of the campaign for Rome. As one might expect, the meat of the book covers the planning and execution of the Anzio landings, defensive battles, and belated breakout. D'Este balances his narrative nicely between the generals making the decisions and the soldiers doing the fighting.

Almost since its inception, controversy has surrounded the Anzio operation. Originally planned to outflank German defenses, the operation quickly bogged down into a deadlock. Consequently, Anzio has become a byword for missed opportunity. Critics have blamed Major General John Lucas, the Anzio commander, for the operation's failure. Claiming that Lucas was too cautious, critics argue that he should have pushed inland immediately after the initial landings. D'Este calls the criticism of the tactical commander "misguided," although D'Este faults Lucas for not seizing some tactical objectives.

Like D'Este's other histories, **Fatal Decision** should not be missed. It's good reading that gives an exciting, provocative account of one of World War II's most brutal campaigns. It also reminds us of the importance of sound, realistic planning in military operations.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

The United States and The Soviet Union and The Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation to The Middle East, A public policy paper by Aaron Karp (Boulder CO; Westview Press, 1990), 32 pages, $7.95.

This booklet is a short but useful primer on ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East. With ballistic missiles, regional enemies can hit each other with conventional, or possibly chemical and nuclear, warheads with little response time. Although some defense is possible against older and slower missiles, the Gulf War showed such defenses are hardly impervious.

Karp describes the history of U.S. and allied attempts to limit the export of ballistic missiles and their technology, primarily to the Middle East. Surprisingly, the U.S. was the first to export such technology, sending tactical Honest John missiles to Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and South Korea between 1959 and 1961. Only after the Soviets began to export FROG and SCUD missiles to Middle East clients did the U.S. restrict sales. As Third World countries gained their own pro-

duction capabilities, the U.S. and its allies penned the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1985, which limited the size and types of missiles and parts which could be exported.

The greatest problems with violations of the MTCR come not from its signatories, but from nonparticipants such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In discussing Soviet missile exports and policy, the author notes they have exercised restraint in the types of missiles they sell.

The author concludes that U.S. policy to restrict missile sales to Mideast nations is hampered by its apparent unwillingness to control Israel's ballistic missile arsenal. As one analyst states, "To expect the Arabs to give up or put restrictions on the very categories of technology which trouble Israel, without any effort to place limits on Israel's missiles and nuclear devices, is unrealistic."

Captain Aaron Danis, USAR
Fairfax, VA

NATO in the 1990's edited by Stanley R. Sloan (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 347 pages, $40.00.

This book had the misfortune to be published just before the world it seeks to analyze changed completely. It assumes that the Soviet military threat will continue undiminished, Eastern Europe will remain under Soviet domination, and NATO is, therefore, critical for Western security. Although the authors failed to foresee recent changes, the book is still valuable for those interested in European security.

The North Atlantic Assembly's Committee on NATO in the 1990's commissioned the book. It begins with the committee's final report. Among the recommendations are increased European defense cooperation, to include the development of a European-scale defense market, as well as a clearer division of labor within the alliance.

The Committee asserts that NATO must adapt to changes in the world, and that development of the elusive "European pillar" within the alliance is vital to its continued viability. Of particular interest, especially after DESERT STORM, are the committee's views on "out-of-area" security issues. While endorsing intensified consultation and cooperation among the allies, the committee sees little chance of achieving more than "complimentary approaches" to out-of-area questions. Contrary to America's desire that NATO play a larger role outside Europe, the committee declares that "implementation of plans or actions should remain independent national choices."

Following the committee's report are chapters tracing the evolution of the alliance and exploring the committee's various recommendations. In one of these, Stephen Szabo analyzes public opinion surveys from the mid-1980's, highlighting differences between American and European views on defense. He emphasizes, for example, that while Europeans generally continue to support NATO, the doctrine of "flexible response" is much less popular there than in the U.S. More ominously, Szabo finds that, unlike in the U.S., the higher the educational level of Europeans, the more likely they are to be critical of NATO and American security policies.

Also of interest are Pierre Lellouche's chapter on the future of the European security system and Robert Hunter's analysis of the "out-of-area" problem. Lellouche describes the erosion of the European defense consensus in the 1980's, focusing in particular on the virtual evaporation of support for nuclear weapons. Hunter argues from a similar position, concluding that NATO can shoulder only regional responsibilities. His view that European response to out-of-area problems must be limited to bilateral arrangements with the U.S. was borne out by events in the Persian Gulf.

Besides its outdated assumptions, the book is marred by distracting misprints and misspellings. However, If the reader can overlook these faults, **NATO in the 1990's** still provides plenty of food for thought on issues of continuing importance.

Captain Chris A. Pilecki
Frankfurt, Germany

OSS Special Weapons and Equipment, Spy Devices of World War II by H. Keith Melton (New York: Sterling Publishing Co, 1991), 128 pages, $14.95.

This is the author's second book on World War II intelligence activity. In 1944, the Office of Strategic Services published an equipment catalog for its agents. Classified RESTRICTED (no longer used), only a few copies exist today. This catalogue was the basis for his new book. He added many pages of new material, most notably, items fielded after 1944 and items developed for other agencies. In many cases, these pages are from his extensive collection of clandestine warfare material.

In addition to equipment, he's also included a list of material on hand at the Algiers OSS Base in 1943. It gives the reader some idea of what it took to outfit a 3,000 man force. He also shows numerous items of what might be called OSS memorabilia.

The author gives a brief history of the National Defense Research Council which guided much of the research and development in World War II.

This is fairly inexpensive for a technical book, but very readable and well worth the price. Most of the items have picture instructions for use by resistance group members who knew very little English and often had no formal

weapons training. Based on our Vietnam experience, anything ever made for warfare shows up somewhere and it's likely that many of these items in some form or another will show up again!

The author is eminently qualified to write on this subject, having possibly the world's largest collection of clandestine warfare material. As the jacket cover indicates, his collection is unmatched by the CIA, FBI, and the Smithsonian. This book is especially useful in conjunction with his first book **Clandestine Warfare**, which covered World War II's intelligence organizations.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) William L. Howard
Largo, FL

The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy through the Maze of Computer Espionage by Clifford Stoll (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 326 pages, $19.95.

Worldwide ADP networks have become the new battlefield of espionage and sabotage. Astronomer Clifford Stoll explores just how extensive a threat to individual privacy, property, and national security this is.

Intelligence and special operations personnel, and anyone who's ever had to pull ADP security manager duty, will find this excellent book fascinating and relevant. It's well organized, neat, and adequately edited. However, the book does suffer from the lack of an index and charts. And the author undermines his text's clarity and conciseness by throwing in "campus humor" digressions, although these do reveal much about the author and his motivations.

The book offers some startling insights into computer security, although it doesn't give a complete view of events because of the material's sensitivity. The author is scientifically objective and accurate, with outstanding sourcing and research. He expresses moral outrage and concern over the invasion of privacy, loss of property, compromise of security, and ultimate loss of trust in ADP systems as a result of the actions of hackers and cyberpunks. His discussion of holes in our computer systems and gaps in our ability to deal with threats should compel broad-based action.

All told, this is an excellent addition to the libraries of people concerned with ADP security.

Major William H. Burgess III
Fort Bragg, NC

The American Experience in Vietnam edited by Grace Sevy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 319 pages, $24.95.

This was written as a textbook for a generation of Americans who are too young to remember Vietnam. It's not as good as other texts (for example, historian Allan R. Millett's) which would serve this purpose better.

Throughout the book, a left-of-center ideology and philosophy are evident. Although it will be interesting to some, the book doesn't meet the overall needs of today's armed forces. The political discussions are often centered on opposing U.S. involvement in Central America rather than on discussing the issues in an objective, analytical manner.

First Lieutenant Gilles Van Nederveen
Washington, D.C.

The Ideology of the Offensive by Jack Snyder (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 267 pages, $9.95.

Unless you're a researcher or a historian, you probably won't enjoy Jack Snyder's **The Ideology of the Offensive**. The author examines the offensive strategies of France, Germany, and Russia at the outbreak of World War I. He begins by examining the ways countries justify their offensive strategies.

Snyder presents the material well with a variety of examples, and creates a good, unbiased model for comparison. However, a more general introduction would have helped the reader's understanding.

Snyder then examines each country's offensive strategies. He presents a solid overview of each nation's rationale for developing its offensive bias. Then he gives a detailed analysis of the evolution of each country's strategy before World War I. Unfortunately, these chapters contain many trivialities with little explanation as to their significance. The author erroneously assumes the reader understands and accepts his conclusions.

The book's premise is good. It tries to show how the countries' offensive strategies inappropriately came into being. Unfortunately, the author fails to support this argument adequately. Unless the reader has researched the topic thoroughly, or can recite **The Guns of August** or **August 1914** by heart, **The Ideology of the Offensive** won't be very useful or understandable.

First Lieutenant Drew A. Swank
Augsburg, Germany



Melting Pot Soldiers, The Union's Ethnic Regiments by William L. Burton (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1988), 282 pages, $40.00.

The author, a professor of history, has written one of the first comprehensive examinations of a particularly American phenomenon—ethnic regiments—during the American Civil War. Dr. Burton drew on regimental histories, state archives, historical societies, and individual letters and diaries to compile his information.

These regiments resulted largely from ethnic politics and the early regimental system that followed, a system that was "based on patronage." At that time, military service, especially militia service, was seen as a way for ethnic people to climb the social ladder. A combination of ethnic chauvinism and the need for large forces at the beginning of the Civil War gave birth to ethnic regiments.

Ethnic units were considered problem children in the early years of the

war. The author quotes Army of the Potomac provost marshal reports: "Irish regiments...carried their tradition of street fighting in Irish communities over into their rowdy behavior in the field."

The cultural chauvinism that produced the recruiting efforts often backfired, as ethnics both resisted the opportunity to fight with "their brother Swedes" and chose instead to enlist as ordinary Americans in regular units. Overall, most ethnics rejected these regiments and served with distinction elsewhere. They were too familiar with the motives of the regiments' organizers, like one Colonel Thomas Francis Meagher who "Always had an eye on a postwar political career and...a willingness and eagerness to use ethnicity and risk the lives of his men to win notoriety for himself."

This book will appeal to the serious Civil War reader interested in an obscure segment of the period.

Captain Rick Ugino, ARNG
Rochester, NY

The Limitations of Military Power edited by John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. Murfett (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 242 pages, $45.00.

This anthology, composed of 10 essays, is a memorial to one of Britain's finest military historians, Professor Norman Gibbs of Oxford University. Gibbs is also identified as one of the early proponents of the interdisciplinary field of strategic studies.

The opening chapter gives a brief overview of Oxford University's study of war. In the curriculum's development, from naval campaigns to the great Napoleonic wars, the school rapidly covers all periods. The other essays deal with one aspect of military power limitations. These, in turn, can be divided into two broad categories: Themes on the limitation of military power and case studies on the limitations of military power.

Although expensive, this very readable book will serve historians interested in the discussion of limitations on the use of military power.

First Lieutenant Gilles Van Nederveen
Washington, D.C.



Eisenhower: A Centennial Life by Michael R. Beschloss (New York: An Edward Burlingame Book, 1990), 253 pages, $29.95.

This is one of a score of books that appeared in 1990 to celebrate the centennial of Dwight D. Eisenhower's birth. I highly recommend it for those who want visual images of Eisenhower and his life.

This book is essentially a pictorial biography. Its over 300 photographs take the reader through Eisenhower's career as an Army officer and the 34th president. While some of the photographs are standards, most of them aren't usually seen—hence the value of the book. Together these pictures give a human portrayal of Eisenhower.

Political historian Michael Beschloss provides an interesting narrative to accompany the pictures. Unfortunately, the text reflects Beschloss' interest as a political rather than a military historian. Although Eisenhower spent over 30 years in the Army and only 8 as president, Beschloss gives more attention to Ike's presidency. While readable and informed, the text isn't remarkable and readers who want a more in-depth analysis of Eisenhower should turn to Stephen Ambrose's two-volume biography.

But this book should be bought for the photographs, not the text. The pictures alone make it a worthwhile book.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

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125th
Military Intelligence Battalion "Eyes of Lightning"

The unit crest consists of a shield of the coat of arms in blue and gray, with a golden scroll inscribed "Eyes of Lightning" in black letters below it. Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with MI units. Centered in the crest is a golden rose, symbolic of secrecy and the covert activities of intelligence. Crossed on the shield are a bayonet, symbolic of readiness and response, and a sword, symbolic of military might. The stars on either side of the shield symbolize the worldwide MI mission. The motto "Eyes of Lightning" refers to the 25th Infantry Division, the "Tropic Lightning" division.

Headquartered at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the 125th MI Battalion (CEWI) provides IEW support to the 25th ID (Light). The 25th ID is the Army's only forward based combat asset targeted against Pacific theater contingencies. In addition to supporting one of the Army's most frequently deployed divisions, the 125th is the Army's most active REDTRAIN unit.

The 125th MI Battalion traces its history back to August 10, 1944, when the 25th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment was activated at New Caledonia. The detachment provided intelligence support to the 25th ID in the Pacific Theater and received the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation for its efforts during the final year of World War II. It was deactivated in Japan after World War II, and was reactivated for the the Korean Conflict, during which it received the Meritorious Unit Commendation. The 25th CIC Detachment returned to Schofield Barracks and was redesignated as the 25th MI Detachment in 1958.

On May 11, 1962, the 372d Army Security Agency (ASA) Company was activated as A Company, 303d ASA Battalion. In 1967, both the 25th MI Detachment and the 372d ASA Company deployed to Vietnam. There, the detachment was redesignated as the 25th MI Company and received four Meritorious Unit Commendations, two awards of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and the Vietnamese Civic Action Medal First Class. The 372d ASA Company participated in over 10 major counteroffenses and received five Meritorious Unit Commendations, four Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry, and one Vietnamese Civil Action Honor Medal. It was deactivated in March 1971.

On June 16, 1983, a reactivated 372d ASA Company merged with the 25th MI Company to form the 125th MI Battalion (CEWI). In February 1987, the Long Range Surveillance Detachment joined the battalion.

The 125th MI Battalion continues to meet many challenges. Recently, the battalion sent linguists and ground surveillance systems personnel to support the 25th ID's Multinational Forces Overseas task force currently involved in the Sinai peacekeeping mission. Elements of the battalion provide support to DEA for counter-drug operations throughout Hawaii. The battalion also supported DESERT SHIELD/STORM with equipment.

The division's facility engineers recently constructed a mock POW camp in a remote Hawaiian gulch, and the battalion's interrogation platoon now runs a "Lifetime in Captivity" course there. The only POW course taught in the Pacific, it offers a unique professional experience for "Tropic Lightning" light fighters.

The future holds a great deal of adventure for the 125th MI Battalion. Supporting a division which must be able to deploy a battalion-sized task force in under 18 hours, the "Eyes of Lightning" holds the key to Pacific Rim intelligence.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca
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
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